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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
State may deny to children who are neither citizens of the United 
\ 
States nor legally admitted aliens, the free public education it 
offers to all other children of the State. 
I 
Since the late nin~teenth century, the United States has 
restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry 
into the United States is a crime, 8 u.s.c. § 1325, and those who 
have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation. But despite 
the existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number 
of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United 
States, and now reside within various States, including the State 
of Texas. 
In May 1975, the Texas legislature revised its education laws 
to withhold from local school districts state funds for the 





districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children 
not "legally admitted" to the country. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. tit. 
2, §21.031 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) .1 These cases involve 
constitutional challenges to those provisions. 
No. 80-1538 
Plyler v. Doe 
This is a class action, filed in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, by 
parents of school-age alien children residing in Tyler, Texas, 
----------
who could not establish that their children had been legally 
~ 
~ admitted into 
~Y--------
the United States. 2 The Superintendent and members 
~
1That section provides, in pertinent part: 
~ (a) All children who are citizens of the United States or 
legally admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years 
~ and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of 
any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the 
Available School Fund for that year. 
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United 
States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of 
five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of 
September of the year in which admission is sought shall be 
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in 
which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person 
having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for 
admission. 
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of 
this state shall admit into the free public schools of the 
district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of 
the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over 
five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the 
scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person 
having lawful control resides within the school district." Tex. 
Educ. Code Ann. tit. 2, §21.031. 
2Although §21.031 was enacted in 1975, the Tyler 
Independent School District continued to enroll undocumented 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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of the Board of Trustees of the Tyler Independent School District 
were named as defendants; the State of Texas intervened as a 
party-defendant. After certifying a class consisting of all 
similarly situated alien children in Tyler, the District Court 
preliminarily enjoined defendants from enforcing §21.031 to deny 
a free education to the plaintiff class. In December 1977, the 
Court conducted an extensive hearing on the request for permanent 
injunctive relief. 
In considering the motion for permanent injunctive relief, the 
District Court made extensive findings of fact. The court found 
that neither the "statute nor the [Tyler school district policy 
implementing the statute] has either the purpose or effect of 
keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas." 458 F. Supp • 
...___ ~ ----
569, 575. Respecting defendants' further claim that the statute 
was simply a financial measure designed to avoid a drain on the 
State's fisc, the court recognized that the increases in 
population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals 
into the United States had created problems for the public 
children until the 1977-1978 school year. In July 1977, it 
adopted a policy barring children who were neither citizens nor 
legally admitted aliens. Section 21.031 had not provided a 
definition of "a legally admitted alien." Tyler offered the 
following clarification: 
"A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or 
she is legally in the United States, or a person who is in the 
process of securing documentation from the United States 
Immigaration Service, and the Service will state that the person 
is being processed and will be admitted with proper 




schools of the State, and that these problems were exacerbated by 
the special educational needs of immigrant Mexican children. The 
court noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was 
primarily attributable to the admission of children who were 
legal residents. Id., at 575-576. Although the "exclusion of 
all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would 
eventually result in economies at some level," id., at 576, the 
court noted that funding from both the state and federal 
governments was based primarily on the number of children 
enrolled. In net effect then, barring undocumented children from 
the schools would save the State money, but it would not 
necessarily improve the quality of education. Id., at 577. The 
court further observed that the impact of §21.031 was borne 
primarily by a small sub-class of illegal aliens, "entire 
families who have migrated illegally and--for all practical 
purposes--permanently to the United States." 3 Id., at 578. - -
Finally, the court observed that under current laws and practices 
"the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of 
tomorrow," 4 and that without an education, these children, 
3The court contrasted this group with the young single males 
who enter the country in order to earn money to send to their 
dependents in Mexico, and who in many instances remain in this 
country for only a short period of time. 458 F. Supp., at 578. 
4The court noted that plaintiff's expert, Dr. Gilbert 
Cardenas, had testified that 50-60% of current legal alien 
workers were formerly illegal aliens, and further noted the 
testimony of a defense witness, Rolan Heston, District Director ~ 
of the Houston District of I.N.S., that "undocumented children ~ 
can and do live ~n the United State for years, and adjust their 
status through marriage to a citizen or permanent resident." The~ 
Footnote-continued on next page. ~ 
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"[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-
speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices ••• will 
become ' bermanently locked into the lowest socio-economic'' 
classes." Id., at 577. 
The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to 
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that §21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting 
that "the state's exclusion of undocumented children from its 
public schools •.. may well be the type of invidiously motivated 
state action for which the suspect classification doctrine was 
designed," the court held that it was unnecessary to decide the 
question whether the statute would survive a "strict scrutiny" 
analysis because the discrimination embodied in the statute was 
not, in any event, supported by a rational basis. Id., at 585. 
The District Court also concluded that the Texas statute violated 
the Supremacy Clause. 5 Id., at 590-593. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
District Court's injunction. The Court of Appeals held that the ~~ 
P'>L 
court also took notice of congressional proposals to "legalize" ~ 
the status of many unlawful entrants. 458 F. Supp. 569, 577-578.~~~ 
See also, n. , infra. ~~~~~~·~ 
5The court found §21.031 inconsistent with the scheme of 
National regulation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
and with federal laws pertaining to funding and discrimination in 
education. The court distinguished DeCanas v. Bica, 424 u.s. 351 
(1973), by emphasizing that the state bar on employment of 
illegal aliens involved in that case mirrored precisely the 
federal policy of protecting the domestic labor market underlying 
the immigration laws. The court discerned no express federal 
policy to bar illegal immigrants from education. 458 F. Supp., 
at 590-593. 
-6-
District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute pre-empted 
by federal law. 6 With respect to equal protection, however, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed in all essential respects the analysis 
of the District Court, concluding that §21.031 is 
"constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it is tested using 
the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test." 
Id., at 458. We noted probable jurisdiction. u.s. (1981). 
No. 80-1934 
In Re: Alien Children Litigation 
During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutionality 
of §21.031 and various local practices under the authority of 
that statute were filed in the United States District Courts for 
the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas. Each 
---- -
suit named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as 
defendants, along with local officials. In November, 1979, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on motion of the 
State, consolidated the claims against the State officials into a 
single action to be tried in the District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March 
1980. On July 21, 1980, the District Court entered an opinion 
and an order holding that §21.031 violated the Equal Protection 
6The Court of Appeals noted that De Canas had not foreclosed 
all state regulation with respect to illegal aliens, and found no 
express or implied congressional policy favoring the education of 
illegal aliens. The court therefore concluded that there was no 
preemptive conflict between state and federal law. 628 F. 2d 
448, 452-454 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 501 F. Supp. 544. The 
court held that "the absolute deprivation of education should 
trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly where the absolute 
deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the 
desired benefit." Id., at 582. The court determined that the 
State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state 
interest; that exclusion of these children had not been shown to 
be necessary to improve education within the State; and that the 
educational needs of the children statutorily excluded was not 
different from the needs of children not excluded. The court 
therefore concluded that §21.031 was not "narrowly drawn" to 
advance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner. 
Id., at 583-583. While appeal of the District Court's decision 
was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No. 
81-1538. Apparently on the strength of that opinion, the Court 
of Appeals, on February 23, 1981, summarily affimed the decision 
of the Southern Distrct. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
u.s. (1981), and consolidated this case with No. 81-1538 
for briefing and argument.8 
II 
7The court concluded that §21.031 was not preempted by 
federal laws or treaties. 501 F. Supp. 544, 584-596. 
8Appellees in both cases continue to press the argument 
that §21.031 violates the Supremacy Clause because it is 
inconsistent with federal law and policy. In light of our 
disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no 
occasion to reach the preemption claim. 
,. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall .•. 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." Appellants argue at the 
outset that undocumented aliens, by virtue of their immigration 
status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of 
Texas, and therefore, have no right to the equal protection of 
Texas law. We reject this argument. 
Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is 
surely a "person" in any ordinary usage of that term. Aliens, 
~
even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long 
been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shauhgnessy v. Mezei, 345 u.s. 
206 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). And 
indeed, w~ h~~ly~held that the Fifth Amendment protects 
illegally present aliens from invidious discrimination by the 
Federal Government. 9 Matthews v. Diaz, 426 u.s. 67, 77 (1976). 
Appellants would distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that 
the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its 
protection to persons "within its jurisdiction," while neither 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fifth 
9It would be incongruous, of · course, to hold that the 
United States, which is assigned by the the Constitution a broad 
authority over both naturalization and foreign affairs, must 
observe standards of equal protection in the treatment of 
unlawful aliens, while exempting the States from a similar 
limitation. See 426 u.s., at 84-86. 
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Amendment contains that assertedly limiting phrase. In 
appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States 
illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if 
they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its 
laws. But neither our cases nor the · logic and history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment supports that narrowing construction of the 
phrase, "within its jurisdiction."10 We have never suggested 
~
10Although we have not previously focused on the intended 
meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first 
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are , citizens of the United States." 
(Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), detailed the history 
of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense 
in which the term "jurisdiction" was used. 
"From the first organization of the National Government under the 
Constitution, the naturalization acts of the United States, in 
providing for the admission of aliens to citizenship by judicial 
proceedings, uniformly required every applicant to have resided 
for a certain time 'within the limits and under the jurisdiction 
of the United States;' and thus applied the words 'under the 
jurisdiction of the United States' to aliens residing here before 
they had taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United 
States, or had renounced allegiance to a foreign government. 
And, from 1795, the provisions of those acts, which granted 
citizenship to foreign-born children of American parents, 
described such children as 'born out of the limits and 
jurisdiction of the United States.' Thus Congress, when dealing 
with the question of citizenship in that aspect, treated aliens 
residing in this country as 'under the jurisdiction of the United 
States,' and American parents residing abroad as 'out of the 
jurisdiction of the United States.' 'I "The words 'in the United States, and subject to the 
, jurisdiction thereof,' in the first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, must be presumed to have been 
understood and intended by the Congress which proposed the 
Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same 
sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the well known case of The Exchange [,7 Cranch 16 
{1812)]; and as the equivalent of the words 'within the limits 
and under the jurisdiction of the United States,' and the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal 
protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that of due 
process. To the contrary, we have recognized that both 
provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of 
converse of the words 'out of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
United States,' as habitually used in the naturalization acts. 
This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word 
'jurisdiction' in the last clause of the same section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to 'deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
It is impossible to construe the words 'subject to the 
jurisdict~on thereof, in the opening sentence, as less 
comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,' in the 
concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons 
'within the jurisidiction' of one of the States of the Union are 
not 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' Id., at 
686-687 (citations omitted). 
Justice Gray concluded: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental 
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the 
allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all 
children here born of resident aliens, with the exception of 
qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign 
sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, 
or of enemies within and during a hotile occupation bf part of 
our territory, and with the single additional exception of 
children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance 
to their several tribes •... Every citizen or subject of another 
country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the 
protection, and consequently within the jurisdiction of the 
United States." Id., at 693 (emphasis added). See also Cong. 
Globe, 39th Cong .--;-Tst Sess. 2768 (May 23, 1866) (colloquy 
between Sens. Wade and Fessenden); id., at 2890 (May 30 1866) 
(remarks of Sen. Howard); id., at 28gr- (remarks of Sen. 
Williams). ---
Given the historical congruence between "jurisdiction," and 
geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles 
of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction can be 
drawn under the Fourteenth Amendment between resident aliens 
whose entry into the United States was lawful, and those whose 
entry was unlawful. See C. Bouve, Exclusion and Expulsion of 
Aliens in the United States 425-427 (1912). 
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persons, and to reach every exercise of State authority. 
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not 
confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.' These provisions are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race 
color, or of nationality; and the protection of the 
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 
Yick Wo, supra, 118 U.S., at 369 (emphasis added). 
In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the 
United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to challenge actions of the Federal 
Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all 
within the boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, 163 u.s., at 
238. 11 Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect 
this territorial theme:l 2 
11In his separate opinion, Justice Field addressed the 
relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment: 
"The terms 'person,' used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough 
to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of 
the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same 
protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes 
obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, 
and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of 
the laws .... The contention that persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of 
the law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar--in face 
of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no 
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." Wong Wing v. United States, 163 u.s., 
at 242-243 (concurring and dissenting). 
12Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), relied on by 
appellants, is not to the contrary. In that case we held, as a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-12-
"Manifestly, the obligation of the Stat~ to give the 
protection of equal laws can be performed only where 
its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. 
It is there that the equality of legal right must be 
maintained. That obligation is imposed by the 
Constitution upon the States severally as governmental 
entities,--each responsible for its own laws 
establishing the rights and duties of persons within 
its borders." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
u.s. 337, 350 (1938). 
There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that 
"due process" is somehow of greater stature than equal 
protection, and therefore available to a larger class of persons. 
To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects 
an elementary limitation on governmental power. To employ the 
phrase "within its jurisdiction" to permit a State to identify 
subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its 
jurisdiction, and thereby relieve itself of the obligation to 
assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to those 
persons, would undermine the purpose for which the Equal 
Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment: 
as a restraint on state authority. The Equal Protection Clause 
matter of statutory construction, that an alien paroled into the 
United States pursuant to §212(d) (5) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §212(d) (5), was not 'within the United 
States' for the purpose of the availing himself of §243(h), which 
allowed for witholding deportation in certain circumstances. The 
conclusion we reached reflected the longstanding distinction 
between federal exclusion proceedings, involving the 
determination of admissibility, and deportation proceedings. It 
is perhaps worth noting that the undocumented children who are 
appellees here, unlike the parolee in Leng May Ma, supra, could 
apparently be removed from the country only pursuant to 
deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §24l(a} (2). See C. Gordon & 
H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, §3.16(b) (1981). 
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was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste 
and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is 
fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here, to 
define a class of persons subject to its laws, as nonetheless 
excepted from its protection. 
Although the congressional debate concerning §1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly confirms 
the understanding that the phrase "within its jurisdiction" was 
intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of equal 
protection to all within a State's territorial perimeter, and to 
all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its laws. 
Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the 
phrase "person within its jurisdiction" sought expressly to 
ensure that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the 
alien population. Representative Bingham reported to the House 
the draft resolution of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction (H.R. 67), which was to become the Fourteenth 
Amendment.l 3 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (Feb. 26, 
1866). Two days later, Bingham posed the following question in 
support of the resolution: 
"Is it not essential to the unity of the people that 
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States? Is it not essential to the unity of the 
13Representative Bingham's views are also reflected in his 
comments on the Civil Rights Bill and the Freedmen's Bureau 
bills. He repeatedly referred to the need to provide protection, 
not only to the freedmen, but to "the alien and stranger," and 
to "refugees •.• and all men." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1292 (March 9, 1866) • 
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Government and the unity of the people that all 
persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this 
land, shall have equal protection in every State in 
this Union in the rights of life and liberty and 
property?" Id., at 1090 (Feb. 28, 1866). 
Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of 
Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, 
was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, 
and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who 
"may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of a State: 
"The . last two clauses of the first section of the 
amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a 
citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever 
he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law, or from denying to him the equal 
protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes 
all class legislation in the States, and does away with 
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a 
code not applicable to another ...• It will, if 
adopted by the States, forever disable every one of 
them from passing laws trenching on the fundamental 
rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the 
United States, and to all persons who may happen to be 
within their jurisdiction." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2766 (May 23, 1866) (emphasis added). 
Use of the phrase, "within its jurisidiction,"14 thus does not 
detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen 
or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches 
into every corner of a State's territory. That a person's 
14The phrase is not without any limiting significance. It 
clearly assures every State that it is not required to provide 
the protection of its laws beyond its own territory, see Blake v. 
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 173-174 (1899), and thereby risk intruding 
on the legislative domain of some other sovereign entity. 
.• 
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initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was 
unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot 
negate the simple fact of presence within the State's territor'al 
perimeter. So long as such a person is within that perimeter, he 
is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the 
State's civil and criminal laws. And until that person 
that jurisdiction--either voluntarily, or involuntarily in 
accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United 
that person is entitled, equally with all others, 
that a State, by law, may choose to provide. 
Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who ------
these cases rna claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amen ment's 
guarantee of equal protection 
I (d ' f f ' 1 ' \~ . {[)h h 
only begins the inquiry. 
1 1cu t quest1on 1s w et er ----- the State ~f Texas, by r fusing to - ~ ~ reimburse local school boards for the education of ch ldren who 
cannot demonstrate that their presence within the Un'ted States 
is lawful, and~et.~h~e~r~~~~~~-------
children the burden of tuition, have classified in manner that 
-----~------------
the Equal Protection Clause forbids. It . is to this question that 
we now turn. 
III 
The Equal Protection Clause requires that " l~persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated ali e." F. S. Royster 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 {1 But so too, 
"[t]he Constitution does not require things are different in 
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the 
. . ' 
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same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940}. The initial 
discretion to determine what is "different," and what is "the 
same," resides in the legislatures of the States. A legislature 
must have a substantial latitude to establish classifications 
that in its view most closely approximate the nature of the 
particular problem perceived, accommodate competing concerns both 
public and private, and ~limitations on the State's ~ 
ability to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection 
Clause to most forms of state action, we have thus required only 
that the classification at issue bear a rational relationhip to 
some legitimate public purpose. See,~~ Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 u.s. 483. 
But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the 
~ 
Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to  
every form of legislative action. Where a classification ~ 
disadvantages a "suspect class," or impinges on the exercise of a 
"fundamental right," we have found it necessary, and consistent 
with the primary purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, to 
subject the legislative classification to a closer scrutiny--one 
that seeks the assurance that the classification has been 
narrowly conceived to meet an important and legitimate state 
interest. 
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals below held that 
Texas' classification failed to meet even the "rational basis" 
•' 
test, appellees press their contention that the Texas scheme 
should be subjected to something more than "minimal scrutiny," 
relying alternatively on both the "suspect class" and 
-17-
~ 
"fundamental rights" lines of cases.l 5 Appellees concede that ~ 
notthe class of undocumented children disabled by §21.031 does 
1) ~ )l "L 
fall neatly
1
into any suspect class identified by our prior --holdings. And they further concede that we have not held 
education to be a "fundamental right," such that the State must 
justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in 
V"" 
which it is provided to its population. See San Antonio School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 u.s. 1 (1973}. While we find that the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment offers clear direction with 
respect to the level of scruitny appropriate for review of 
§21.031, and that in this context a~ understanding of both the 
nature of the classification, and the right denied, are integral 
15Appellees' argument for heightened scrutiny has proceeded on 
several fronts. In addition to the claim that the class of 
illegal aliens be deemed constit~tionally suspect, a question we 
do not decide, · see n. infra, appellees argue here that the 
Tyler tuition eharge qiscriminates on the basis of wealth. rt 
light of the fact that the t~tion c~ar~e is discriminatorily ~ 
applied, we do not focus on the potential dis arate impact of 
such a charge on persons with vary ng econom1c capa 1 1 ies. e 
have no occassion to consider whether a uniform tuition charge, 
i~stituted either in lieu of or supplementary to Texas' current 
system of publicly financed elementary education, would run afoul 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In addition, appellees in No. 80-1538 initially argued that 
§21.031 manifested a discrimination on the basis of national 
origin. That cl~im had "dropped out" at the time of trial, 458 
F. Supp., at 572 n. 4, and formed no part of the decision of 
either the district court or Court of Appeals' decisions in favor 
of appellees. In No. 80-1934, the claim of discrimination on the 
basis of national origin formed the predicate, under 42 U.S.C. 
2000h-2, for the intervention of the United States. It was 
rejected by the District Court, 501 F. Supp. at 575-576, and 
consideration of that claim was not reflected in the Court of 
Appeals' summary affirmance. The United States has not sought to 
press that claim in this Court. See Brief for the United States 
Amicus Curiae in No. 1538 and Brief for the United Stated in 80-
1934, at 5-6, n. 3. 
. '
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to our assessment, we take in turn appellee's arguments for 
heightened scrutiny relying alternatively on our "suspect class" 
or "fundamental rights" cases. 
A 
Several formulations explain our treatment of particular 
legislative classification as "suseect." Certain classifications 
~- - -
are empirically more likely than others to reflect deep-seated 
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some ? 
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice ~ 
is well recognized as incompatible with the constitutional 
understanding that each man is to be judged individually, valued 
equally, and entitled to equal justice under the law. 
Classifications treated as suspect tend also to be those that are 
~
least likely to be relevant to any proper legislative goal. See 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 u.s. 184, 192 (1964) ~ Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 u.s. 81, 100 (1943). Finally, certain groups, 
indeed largely the same groups, have historically been "relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 372 (1971); see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 
4 (1938). In to classi ications 
adversely affecting "discrete and insular minorities --relatively 
small in number, identifiable by immutable or nearly immutable 
personal attributes or status, habitually victimized--we afford 
-19-
no judicial preference to their condition. The experience of our 
Nation has taught us that conscious or unconsci us, but in any 
event constitutionally unacceptable, prejudice is likely to 
manifest itself in the legislature's treatment of some groups. 
That experience is encapsulated in the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special 
disabilities on such groups suggests precisely the kind of "class 
'---




Illegal ---- play many of the 
" 'screte and 'nsular" minorities for 
characteristics of those I 
which the Constitution 
offer~a special solicJltude. We need not labor over historical 
materials before acknowledging that aliens have been "saddled 
with .•• disabilities, .•• subjected to ••• a history of unequal 
treatment, •.. and relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ~~ 
majori tar ian political process." San Antonio School Dist._.:--~ 
supra, 411 U.S., at 28. Many of the reasons that have prompte  
us to regard §iiden.!:,_ali~as a "prime example of a discrete 
and insular minority •.. for whom heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 
372, apply with even greater force to illegal aliens. Lawfully .... ~ _______.... ~ ...-
resident aliens may have some access to political forums, if only 
in an advisory capacity, and may freely avail themselves of the 
judicial process. In contrast, illegal aliens are understandably ~ 
reluctant to risk exposure by bringing their complaints to the 
attention of public agencies and law enforcement authorities, 
-20-
whether those complaints are a direct result of discriminatory 
treatment by virtue of immigration status or arise from some 
less invidious source. Lax enforcement of the law barring entry 
into this country, coupled with the refusal to create an J~ 
effective bar to the employment of illegal aliens, has resulted ~ 
in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal 
aliens within our national boundaries, 16 and has evoked the very 
real specter of a permanent caste of persons, welcomed as a 
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless unable to participate in 
the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and 
lawful residents. 17 The population of illegal aliens within this 
16The Attorney General recently estimated the number of 
illegal aliens within this country at between 3 and 6 million. 
In presenting to both the Senate and House of Representatives 
several presidential proposals for reform of the immigration 
laws--including one to "legalize" many of the illegal entrants 
currently residing in the United States by creating for them a 
special status under the immigration laws--the Attorney General 
noted that this subclass is largely composed of persons with a 
permanent attachment to the nation, and that they are unlikely to 1-
be displaced from our territory: ~~· 
"We have neither the ~ource~ , the cai?ablili ty, nor the ~ 
motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many 
of whom have become, in effect, members of the community. By 
granting limited legal status to the productive and law-abiding 
members of this shadow population, we will recognize reality and 
devote our enforcement resources to deterring future illegal 
arrivals." V 
17As the District Court observed in No. 80-1538, the 
confluence of government policies has resulted in 
"the existence of a large number of em loyed illegal aliens, such 
as the parents of plaintiffs in this ca e, ose presence is J/Yw'' 
tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are 
virtually defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous 
neglect to which the state or the state's natural citizens and 
business organizations may wish to subject them." 458 F. Supp., 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~7.~ 
~~~ 
country is assuredly one very much in nee of protection • . T
extent that need alone could provide the constitutional auth~ 




would surely be ntitled to it. 
hese cases are members of
" 
The children who are plaintiffs in 
,, 
this underclass of illegal inhabitants. Indeed, they are spec~ 
members of that class. Persuasive arguments can be made that 
state legislatures enjoy unusual prer~gatives with respect to 
--------~ ~ 
persons whose presence within the boundaries of the United States 
has been the product of their wrongful conduct. 18 These arguments 
do not apply with equal force to classifications imposing 
at 585. 
18several factors suggest that "ille9E l a J iw:~.s; " should ~ be 
deemed a "suspect class." Unlike mo st o :t" the classifications 
that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by 
virtue of entry into this country, is generally the product of 
voluntary action. Indeed, entry into he c ass is itself a 
crJ~ · In addition, it could ar y be suggested that the status 
of " llegal alienage" is presumptively irrelevant to every 
legislative action. With respect to the actions of the federal 
government, alienage classifications may be intimately related to 
the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to 
control access to the United States, and to the plenary federal 
power to determine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance 
to become a citizen of the Nation. No State may independently 
exercise a like power. But if the Federal Government has by 
uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate 
standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the states may, 
of course, follow the federal direction. Nor are the states 
wholly without power to meet legitimate demographic and economic 
concerns arising from a potential influx of persons from outside 
this country. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 u.s. 351 (1976). We have no 
need in this case to resolve the difficult problem that might be 
presented by the application of equal protection standards tto 
state classifications based on illegal alienage in other 
circumstances. We hold only that in the context of §21.03l's 
absolute denial of educati on to this_ dis~ r~t~ cla~s~of 
undoc umen t ed children, strict scr Uti ny 1 s the appropriate 
stand ard of review. 
,• 
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particular disabilities on the children of such unlawful 
entrants. Persons who elect to enter our territory by stealth 
and in violation of law might be asked to bear the burden of 
legislation designed to deter their unlawful entry.l9 The 
children of those persons are hardly similarly situated. Their 
"parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal 
norms," and indeed possess the power to remove themselves from 
the jurisdiction of the State of Texas, but the children who are 
plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' 
------------------------~-------------------------------condu,Qt nor ~ir own status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, -
770 (1977). Whatever efficacy the State might find in attempting 
to reach the conduct of adults by acting against their children, 
legislation directing the onus of parent's misconduct on his 
children does not comport well with our most fundamental 
cpnceptions of justice. 
"[V]isiting ... condemnation on the head of an infant 
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing 
disabilities on the •.• child is contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his 
birth and penalizing the ••• child is an ineffectual--
as well as unjust--way of deterring the parent." Weber 
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 
19The courts below noted the ineffectiveness of the Texas 
provision as a means of controlling the influx of illegal 
entrants into the State. See 628 F. 2d, at 460-461; Doe v. 
Plyler, 458 F. Supp., at 585; In re Alien Children Education 
Litigation, 501 F. Supp., at 578 ("the evidence demonstrates that 
undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free public 
education. Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come 
into this country seek employment opportunities and not education 
benefits .... There was overwhelming evidence ... of the 






We recognize that it cannot be said that undocumented status 
is "constitutionally irrelevant to~ proper legislative goal" 
of the State of Texas. Further, the characteristic deemed 
decisive under the Texas scheme, migration status, is not 
absolutely immutable, since it is the product of conscious 
action. These considerations militate against affording illegal 
alienage a heightened scrutiny in every circumstance. 
Nevertheless, immigration status is a characteristic over which 
the undocumented children who are plaintiffs in this case have -r~ ______________________ , ___________________________________ __ 
little or no control. In addition, the classification at issue --in the Texas scheme adversely targets a discrete class exhibiting 
many of the characteristics of powerlessness and vulnerability 
that have previously evoked special constitutional solicitude. 
Thus, while there are distinguishing characteristics between the 
classification at issue here and others for which we have 
afforded our most exacting scrutiny, it suffices for the moment 
to recognize the presence of many of the more significant factors 
suggesting that legislation disabling "undocumented children" is 
in the nature of "class or caste" legislation with which the the 
Equal Protection Clause has historically been most directly 
concerned. ~ 
/h~~ 
Appellees base a ~-o-n_d ___ c_l_a_l-.m-_-t_o_~_s_t_r_i_c_t_s_c_r_u_t_i__,n~ on the 
B 
assertion, not at issue in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
VL ~<\ 
supra, at 37, that the absolute denial of basic education 
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represents an interference with "fundamental rights." In 
determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is 
deserving of heightened scrutiny, we look first to the 
Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source 
therein. But we have also recognized the fundamentality of 
participation in state "elections on an equal basis with other 
citizens in the jurisdiction," Dunn, supra, at 336, even though 
no right to vote in state elections is conferred by the 
Constitution. See San Antonio School Dist., at 35-36 & n. 78. 
We have frequently explained the need for strict scrutiny in 
------------~ ~ 
matters involving suffrage as evolving from the signficance of 
the franchise as the guardian of all other rights. See Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 u.s. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356, 
370 (1886). That synthesis does not, however, represent a 
judicial exercise in public policy formation. The decision to 
subject state classifications in a particular legislative context 
to the rigorous standards of strict scrutiny is legitimate only 
so long as it reflects the objectives of the Nation in adopting 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, supra, at 667-668, 670. It is from this perspective 
that we approach our analysis of the interest affected by 
§21.031. 
Education is not among the rights explicitly guaranteed 
the Constitution. San Antonio School Dist., supra, at 35. But 
undeniably "the American people have always regarded education 
and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme 
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importance," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390, 400 (1923), and 
"the public school as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government." Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203, 230 (1963) (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring). "Some degree of education is necessary to 
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently 
our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and 
independence." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205, 221 (1972). And 
we have recently observed that "[t]hese perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed 
by the observations of social scientists." Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68~ 77 (1979). Not alone does the child deprived of an 
education suffer the inability to participate effectively in 
civic and cultural institutions: our Nation suffers too when 
select groups are denied the opportunity to contribute to the 
community of ideas within which freedom and democracy thrive. 20 
20Because the state does not afford noncitizens the right 
to vote, and may limit participation in matters central to the 
political community to citizens, appellants argue that denial of 
a basic education to these children is of less significance than 
the denial to some other group. Whatever the current status of 
these children, the courts below concluded that many wtll 
eventually become citizens. The fact that many will not, is not 
dec1s , even w1t respect to the importance of education to 
participation within the core institutions of our political 
community. "[T]he benefits of education are not reserved to 
those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty." 458 
F. Supp., at 581 n. 14. In addition, although a noncitizen 
"may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he 
may play a role, perhaps e ven a leadership role in other areas of 
import to the community." v Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 
(1977). Finally, we observe that the significance of education 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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While the benefit of education to the political and cultural 
community of our Nation is substantial, it is to be remembered 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect 
individuals. That Amendment was intended to abolish those 
governmental barriers which stood as an obstacle to personal 
advancement on the basis of individual merit and which deprived 
persons of opportunity because of the circumstances of their 
birth. "[E]ducation prepares individuals to be self-reliant and 
self-sufficient participants in our society." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
In this society, the public schools provide the I 
by which individual initiative and merit are 
supra, at 221. 
primary vehicle 
allowed to overcome the circumstances of birth. The interest in 
public education we identified 28 years ago in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 u.s. 483, 493 (1954), has not diminished over 
time: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It 
is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibiliites, even service in the armed forces. It 
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later 
progessional training, and in helping him adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
to our society is not limited to its political and cultural 
fruits. The public schools are an important socializing 
institution, inculcating those shared values through which social 
order, and stabilty, are maintained. 
•' 
-27-
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms. 
The debates and actions of the Reconstruction Congress clearly 
reflect both aspects of educational need: first, the importance 
of basic education as a means of advancing the material and 
spiritual well-being of the individual: and second, the Nation's 
need for education in fulfulling its constitutional commitment to 
equality, and in preserving an orderly democratic society. 
Indeed, if the views of the proponents of that Amendment can be 
taken as evidence, it is clear that education as an ingredient of 
social equality lay near the core of the Nation's concern. 21 
In a speech supporting his introduction of the initial 
product of the Committee of Fifteen's efforts toward what was to 
become the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Bingham found no 
excuse for a legal system that had reduced men "to a level with 
21As soon as the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened, Senator 
Wilson introduced a bill designed to restrain enforcement of the 
the Black Codes. He explained the urgent need for such 
legislation to ensure that the 
"man made free by the Constitution of the United States is a 
freeman indeed: ... that he can go into the schools and educate 
himself and his children. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 
111 (emphasis added) . 
Senator Wilson's bill was apparently withdrawn when the Senate 
took up consideration of a bill to extend the Freedmen's Bureau. 
The debates on that bill also reflect the importance of education 
within the plan of reconstruction. See Id., at 586, 590 (remarks 
of Rep. Donnelly): id., at 322 (remarks of Senator Trumball). 
See also the Report-of Major General Carl Schurz on Conditions of 
the South, Senate Executive Document No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 25 (1865), which had earlier documented the South's 
resistance to education for the freedman. 
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brutes of the field, ••. condemning them to toil without reward, 
to live without knowledge, and die without hope." Cong. Globe, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1090 (February 28, 1867). The 
congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment did not focus 
on the Equal Protection Clause. But concern for equal access to 
education is clearly revealed in the remarks of those Senators 
who did address its intended effect. Senator Howe of Wisconsin 
spoke of the need for the Amendment in terms of the type of 
unequal laws that had been imposed in the wake of abolition, 
citing the manner in which one State had purported to provide 
"for the education of her colored population." Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess., App. at 219 (June 5, 1866). 22 
On June 8, 1866, very shortly before the Amendment was 
approved by the Senate, Senator Henderson of Missouri described 
the recent actions in the South that, in his view, necessitated 
its passage. Again, denial of education was cited: 
"The South saw its opportunity and promptly collected 
together all the elements of prejudice and hatred 
against the negro for puposes of future party power. 
They denied him the right to hold real or personal 
property, excluded him from their courts as a witness, 
denied him the means of education and forced upon him 
unequal burdens. Though nominally free, so far as 
22senator Howe queried his colleagues in the following terms: 
"I have submitted to you one of the statutes in one of these 
States ..• touching one of the great interests not only of the 
colored population but of the State itself, and I ask you •.• if 
•.. you dare hesitate to put in the Constitution of the United 
States a positive inhibition upon exercising the power of local 
government to sanction such a crime as I have just portrayed." 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess., App. at 219 (June 5, 1866). 
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discriminating legislation could make him so he was yet 
a slave." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3034 
(emphasis added). 
Subsequent congressional actions confirm the importance of 
basic education within the framework of equality that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to promote. One of the 
clearest illustrations of the extraordinary regard with which the 
Nation then held education is to be found in the debates 
concerning the readmission of the former Confederate States. The 
Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, required the former States 
of the Confederacy to reapply for readmission to Congress upon 
fulfillment of certain conditions. Congress perceived its role 
as one of ensuring that those States established a republican 
form of government, evaluating their state constitutions in that 
respect and for "conformity with the Constitution of the United 
States." Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, §5, 14 Stat. 
428. 23 
23The Fortieth Congress considered a Supplementary Bill on 
Reconstruction in March, 1867. A last-minute amendment was 
proposed to require any State seeking readmission to include in 
its constitution a guarantee that the State would maintain free 
public schools, open to all without regard to race. The 
amendment was defeated by an equally divided vote of the Senate. 
Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., lst Sess. 170 (March 18, 1867). 
Nevertheless, the debates on that provision confirm Congress' 
view of education as a core element in the framework of 
Fourteenth Amendment equality--and further reveal the continuing 
congressional concern for state sovereignty that moderated 
enthusiasm for federal intervention into the field of education. 
Senator Howe, who endorsed the amendment, had earlier noted 
that he "would be sorry to find an American Senator who would 
stand up in the face of our recent experiences and deny that 
education is essential to the national welfare ..•• " Cong. 
Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (March 12, 1867), and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The in her constitution a guarantee 
emphatica red that if any State seeking readmission 
"should show me in any one of their organized laws a single 
provision denying the right to education to any portion of the 
people in those districts •.• I should sit here until the walls 
of this Capitol rotted down before I would vote to reclothe such 
a community with the prerogatives of a State." Id., at 71. 
Senator Morton thought it "the very essence of reconstruction 
that these people shall be educated •... The education of the 
people is essential to the execution of the guarantee that we 
shall secure to each State a republican form of government." 
Id., at 69; see id., at 168. And Senator Sumner, who introduced 
the amendment, ventured the opinion that if the Southern States 
had freely provided education to their white population, they 
would never have rebelled. "A population that could not read and 
write naturally failed to comprehend and appreciate a republican 
government." Id., at 167; see id., at 50, 165-167. 
But the debate, and the fate-of that measure, suggest 
ambiguity in the historical record regarding the appropriate 
extent . of federal involvement in education. Several Senators 
were clearly concerned with the implications for State 
sovereignty resulting from the congressional imposition of an 
affirmative State obligation to finance public education. For 
example, Senator Patterson, who supported the imposition of a 
universal education provision on the readmitted States, noted 
that in principle he would favor a similar requirement imposed on 
the States of the Union--if such a requirement were not 
unconstitutional. He was also concerned about the difficulty of 
supporting such a program through taxation. Id., at 168. 
Senator Williams, who voted against the measure, emphasized the 
financial accountability of the States. Id., at 169. Senator 
Frelinghuysen suggested that the Federal Government hlad no right 
to undertake to provide free school systems for the States. Id., 
at 169. 
These sovereignty concerns were tied to the propriety of 
imposing the affirmative obligation on the states, through their 
State constitutions, to establish and finance a system of free 
public education. With respect to the second aspect of the 
provision--that barring discrimination in the provision of 
education--there was no objection. Indeed, Senator Frelinghuysen 
thought the provision superfluous in this respect because "[t]he 
fourteenth amendment has that provision, and that amendment must 
be a part of the constitution [of the State seeking readmission] 
before any one of these States can be introduced." Id., at 168. 
Thus it is evident that while many doubted the constitutionality 
or propriety of the proposal because of concerns for State 
sovereignty, they endorsed its implicit recognition of the 
significance of education, and the importance of barring 
discrimination in its provision. Id., at 167, 168 {remarks of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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barring racial discrimina · n with respect to suffrage, jury 
service, and in the school fund or school 
privileges. concerned that political forces . within -
the State might seek to repeal those provisions after Virginia 
gained reentry. Debate focused on language in the readmission 
bill barring the State from ever making such changes. 24 H.R. 
783, Cong. Globe, 41st. Cong., 2nd Sess., 362 (January 1870). 
Several Representatives thought these "fundamental conditions" 
necessary to a republican form of government. 25 Representative 
Scofield perceived the bill as the extension of the basic 
principles that had guided the Republican Party through the 
period of Reconstruction. With the abolition of slavery 
complete, the next step was to educate blacks "so that they could 
not be restored to slavery." Id., at 500. He noted: 
Sens. Frelinghuysen and Hendricks). 
24 rn pertinent part, H.R. 783 provided: 
"That the constitution of said State shall never be so amended or 
changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the 
United States of the right to vote or hold office •.. or to 
prevent any person on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude from serving as a juror or participating 
equally in the school fund or school privileges provided for in 
said constitution." See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 362 
(emphasis added). 
The Virginia readmission bill initially passed by the House did 
not include these conditions, id., at 502-503, but they were 
restored in the Senate, id., atl643, and the House concurred. 
Id., at 717; see Act of Jan. 26 1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63. 
25see Id., at 485 (remarks of Rep. Ward) (" [S]o long as you 
secure the-]ury-box, the ballot-box, and school privileges to the 




"[T]his new constitution of Virginia has very wisely 
provided for equal franchise and equal education in 
that Commonweatlth ••.• I regard the first provision, 
enjoining upon [the people of that Commonwealth] to 
keep up free education and free franchise as .•• an 
intimation to them that we look upon those features of 
their constitution as the features that make it 
republican in form." Ibid. 
The same "fundamental conditions" were imposed on 
Mississippi 26 , and on Texas 27 , in readmitting each to Congress. 
26 Act of Feb. 23, 1870, c. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68. The 
Mississippi readmission bill was vehemently debated in the 
Senate. Senator Howard sought to support the "fundamental 
conditions" as necessary for a republican form of government. 
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 1218 (February 11, 1870). 
Senator Thurman pressed the argument that since neither 
"universal suffrage nor univeral education" was made a test of a 
republican form of government by the Framers of the Constitution, 
and since both were unknown at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, the Congress had no authority to impose such conditions. 
Ibid. Three days later, Senator Howard responded to Senator 
Thurman's position: 
"Now sir, if there be any one proposition more generally admitted 
than any other among American citizens, politicians, and 
statesmen, it is that in order to uphold and maintain a 
republican form of government such as is understood and practiced 
on this continent, the diffusion of knowledge by means of primary 
schools is the greatest, the safest, and the most effectual 
instrument." Id., at 1253. 
Senator Morton then responded to the suggestion "that in 
guarantying to a State a republican form of government now, we 
cannot go beyond the definition of a republican form of 
government in 1787." Id., at 1254. He argued that basic 
constitutional conceptions had been changed by the recent 
amendments: 
"I controvert the position that this clause means the same thing 
now in the Constitution that it did in 1787, because every 
amendment that is put into that instrument which is in conflict 
with an existing clause modifies and changes that existing 
clause. • .• 
" ..• I will ask my friend from Minnesota, in securing a 
republican form of government in the State of Mississippi, what 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that among 
those who were fundamentally in accord with the broad principles 
of abolition and reform embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
many nonetheless hesitated before imposing upon the States the 
federal duty, and fiscal burden, of establishing a statewide 
system of free public education. 28 These concerns for State 
~ 
sovereignty persisted, even as the Fourteenth Amendment was 
partially reshaping our federal structure with respect to the 
preservation of individual rights, and served to temper the 
better means can we employ that the universal education of that 
people? 
" ..• I reply to the argument of the Senator from Ohio, that 
the definition of a republican form of Government once consistent 
with the slavery of one half or two thirds of the people; once 
consistent with the denial of civil rights to one half of the 
people; once consistent with the denial of education and of 
protection to a majority of the people, has been changed by the 
repeated amendments or the constitution, and such a Government 
would now be utterly inconsistent with a republican form of 
government as defined by the Constitution of the United States." 
Id., at 1254-1255. 
27Act of March 30, 1870, c. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81. 
28see n. 23, supra. The attempts to impose upon the States 
an affirmative duty to provide public education were largely 
quixotic, and reflected no fundamental part of the reconstruction 
program. For example, after the joint resolution proposing the 
Fourteenth Amendment had been submitted to the States for 
ratification, Representative Ashley sought to promote a revision 
of that amendment which would have combined a national rule of 
suffrage with the requirement that: "Each State shall establish 
and maintain, by equitable taxation, a thorough and efficient 
system of free public schools throughout the State, sufficiently 
numerous for the accommodation of all the children of the State." 
Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 117 (Dec. 10. 1867). This 
proposal, intended to assure that "every child shall be secured 
in its right to attend school until it attains the rudiments of 
an education in the language of this country," id., at 118 (Rep. 
Ashley), apparently died in the Judiciary Committee with the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
, • 
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enhusiasm for education as a cure for the Nations' ills. But 
equal access to basic education was .recognized by the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as an essential aspect of the framework 
of equality embodied in that Amendment. -The outright denial of 
education to selected groups was identified as an historical tool 
of political oppression and social subjugation. Education was 
affirmatively identified as vital to the personal advancement of 
the freedman. Education was cited as the basis upon wh.ich 
suffrage must rest, and as the mechanism by which social cohesion 
and order . might be restored to the Nation. 
c 
With this understanding of the objectives of the Nation in 
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, we may determine the proper 
level of deference to be afforded the classification embodied in 
§21.031. Ambiguity in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
reflecting the persisting theme of federalism, see San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, supra, at 44, suggests the ~eed for judicial restraint ~ 
in subjecting to an exacting equal protection review state 
legislative decisions involving the financing, and supervision, 
of public schools. 
But in one respect, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
--~--------------------- ~ 
unambiguous with respect to education. The Framers recognized 
that by denying certain disfavored groups access to basic 
education, we deny to the members of those groups the ability to 
advance their material well-being, to contribute productively to 
society, and the means to protect themselves within the structure 
.· 
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of our social and civic institutions. Indeed, when we deny to 
some disfavored group the right to a basic education, we deny to 
that disfavored group, and its members, the only effective means 
by which they might raise the level of esteem in which they are 
currently held. The Equal Protection Clause could not lightly 
sanction that paradox. 
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) , we faced an equal protection challenge to the Texas 
system of financing public education. The Texas scheme, which 
relied in part on local property tax payments, was alleged to 
classify on the basis of a suspect classification--wealth--and to 
impinge on a fundamental interest--education. The Court rejected 
both claims to strict judicial scrutiny. With respect to the 
"suspect class" line of analysis, we declined to extend our "most 
exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates 
against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by 
the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts." Id., at 28. 
Responding to the argument that education constitutes a 
fundamental right under the Constitution, we observed that 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities --to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for -------finding an interference with fundamental rights where only _,...._- _ _
relative differences in spending levels are involved .••• " rd., 
at 37. 
This case lies far on the other end of the equal protection 
,· 
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spectrum from Rodriguez. We are not presented here with a 
complex scheme of finance and funding indirectly resulting in 
comparative disadvantages for a fluid group, definable for 
purposes of equal protection analysis only by presence within a 
less favored geographic area. Rather, §21.031 is expressly 
structured to impose direct and substantial disabilities on a 
discrete and historically demeaned group, solely on the basis of 
personal status. See Id., at 25 n. 60. As we have seen, the 
State's facial discrimination on the basis of that status, 
particularly as it affects children who are themselves unable to 
work any significant change in their circumstance, parallels in 
significant respects the type of "class or caste" legislation 
with which the Equal Protection Clause is most directly 
concerned. It may well be that the very unusual status of 
undocumented children might allow a State some latitude to 
classify in a manner having a direct, adverse, and apparently 
discriminatory, impact on that group. But we think that to bar 
such a class from the public schools would be starkly 
inconsistent with the historical premises upon which the Equal 
Protection Clause rests, and an affront to the regard for 
education as a primary tool of equality, implicit therein. 
Absent the assurance that the classification embodied in §21.031 
advances some vital state need, it cannot withstand review. 
IV 
Appellants argue that the classification at issue 29 furthers 
Footnote(s) 29 will appear on following pages. 
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an interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources 
for the education of its lawful residents." Br. for Appellants 
26. We note that this formulation of the State's interest 
appears to assume its conclusion--it begins with the premise that 
the State is entitled to prefer lawful residents to "unlawful 
residents" solely on the basis of that federally defined 
status. 30 If illegal aliens were beyond the ambit of equal 
protection, appellants' premise might be supportable. But 
because illegal aliens are entitled to the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the State must do more than justify its 
~~ 
 29Appellant Tyler School District sought at oral argument to 
characterize the alienage classification contained in §21.031 as 
but a test of residence. We cannot uphold §21.031 on that basis. 
Appellan t s concea~that if, for example, a Virginian entered 
Tyler with his school age children, intending to remain only six 
months, those children would be viewed as residents and entitled 
to attend Tyler schools. Tr. of Or. Arg. 31-32. It is thus 
clear that Tyler's res~nce argument amounts to nothing more 
than the as rti that ille al entry, without more, prevents a 
person rom becoming a resident for purposes of enrolling his 
children in the public schools. A State may not, however, 
accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited by the Equal 
Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as non-
resident. Appellants have not shown that the families of 
undocumented children do not comply with the established 
standards by which the State has historically tested residence. 
we note that §21.03l(b) requires a county to provide education 
only to resident children. The counties of the State are as free 
to apply to undocumented children established criteria for 
determining residence as they are to apply those criteria to any 
other child who seeks admission. See generally Arredondo v. 
Brockette, 648 F. 2d 425 (CAS 1981). 
30 In this respect, the prerogatives of the State are 
significantly different from those of the Federal Government. 
Drawing distinctions between illegal aliens and lawfully admitted 
aliens, is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of the 
business of the Federal Government, see Matthews v. Diaz, 426 
u.s., at 85, but not of the states. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 423 U.S. 
1, 7 n. 8 (1977). 
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discrimination as the concise expression of its intention to 
discriminate~ See Examining Board v. Otero, 426 u.s. 572, 605 
(1976). If strict scrutiny is to have meaning, it must be that 
~ 
the important interest that the State seeks to further, is one 
I 
independent of the distinction itself. This is true even "when a 
state borrows a classification from Congress, [because] the 
question remains whether the distinction is a reasonable one for 
the purposes for which the state seeks to use it." Oyama v. 
California, 332 u.s. 633, at 665 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). Concern for fiscal integrity alone can hardly 
support the basis upon which a classification used in allocating 
those fiscal resources is drawn, especially where the 
classification is subject to strict scrutiny. Graham v. 
Richardson, supra, 403 U.S., at 374-375. 
might support the State classification. 
First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek 
to protect the State from an influx of illegal immigrants. While 
a State may have an interest in mitigating the potentially 
significant effects of sudden demographic shifts in population, 31 
31Although the State has no direct interest in controlling 
entry into this country, that interest being one reserved by the 
Constitution to the Federal Government, unchecked unlawful 
migration might impair the State's economy generally, or the 
State's ability to provide some important service. Despite the 
exclusive federal control of this Nation's borders, we cannot 
conclude that the states are wholly without power to react to a 
significant influx of persons who have entered the United States 
without Federal sanction, and whose numbers might have a 
discernible impact on traditional state concerns. See DeCanas v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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it is clear that §21.031 hardly offers an efficacious method of 
dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem. There is 
no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose 
any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, 
the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize 
public services while contributing their labor to the local 
economy and tax money to the State fisc. 458 F. Supp., at 578; 
501 F. Supp., at 571. In addition, it was clearly established 
below that the dominant incentive for illegal entry is the 
availability of employment; few, if any, illegal immigrants come 
'-........__ ________ ----
to this country to avail themselves of a free education. Even 
assuming that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy of 
the State was negative, we think it clear that "[c]harging 
•A nAJ tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously 
vr"~ ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration," at 
least when compared with the alternative of focusing directly on 
the problem of employment. 458 F. Supp., at 585. See 628 F. 2d, 
at 461; 501 F. Supp., at 579 & n. 88. 
Second, appellants suggest that the admission of undocumented 
children will deplete the limited educational resources of the 
State, and to avoid this depletion, undocumented children are 
appropriately sing~ed out for exclusion because of the burden 
they impose on the public schools. The record in no way supports 
the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is an effective 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-356 (1976). 
,. 
-40-
means of improving the quality of education in the State. As the 
District Court in No. 80-1934 noted, the State failed to offer 
any "credible supporting evidence that a proportionately small 
diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might result 
from devoting some funds to the education of the excluded group] 
will have a grave impact on the quality of education." 501 F. 
Supp., at 583. And, after reviewing the State's school financing 
mechanism, the District Court in No. 80-1538 concluded that 
barring undocumented children from local schools would not 
necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those 
schools. Of course, even if improvement in the quality of 
edcuation were a likely result of barring some number of children 
from the schools of the State, the State would have to support 
its selection of this group as the appropriate target for 
exclusion. In terms of cost and educational need, undocumented 
children are "basically indistinguishable" from legally resident 
alien children. 458 F. Supp., at 589: 501 F. Supp., at 583. 
Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are 
appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within 
the United States renders them less likely than other children to 
--------------------~ ----------
remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their 
education to productive social or political use within the State. 
Even assuming that such an interest were legitimate, it is an 
interest that is most difficult to quantify: the State has no 
assurance that any child will employ the education provided by ----
the State within the confines of the State's borders. In any 
event, the record is clear that many, if not most, of the 
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undocumented children disabled by this classification, are likely 
to remain in this country, if perhaps not in the State of Texas, 
and many will ultimately become lawful residents or citizens of 
the United States. It is for the benefit of the Nation that the 
Constitution bars discrimination. We think that the State takes 
a risk inconsistent with that constitutional mandate when it 
denies an education to a group of children on the assumption that 
some of those children will ultimately depart from our borders. 
IV 
The justifications offered by the State in support of §21.031 
do not approach the showing of compelling need required if a 
State is to deny to this discrete group of children the free 
public education it offers to every other child residing within 
its borders. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
in each of these cases is 
Affirmed. 
lfp/ss 02/04/82 
80-1538 Doe v. Plyler 
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment. 
I join the judgment of the court. Although I 
agree with a good deal of the Court's opinion, I do not 
join it. Perhaps understandably, the Court undertakes an 
extensive analytical and historical justification of its 
conclusion that the state's classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. Few provisions in the 
Constitution have prompted as much diverse writing as this 
clause, and perhaps no other provision presents comparable 
difficulties of consistent analysis or in identifying 
limiting principles. I therefore think it advisable to 
view this as the unique case that it is - one quite 
without precedent. 
The classification in question severely 
disadvantages children who are the victims of a 
combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico into 
available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens 
are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps 
2. 
by other benefits as well. This is a problem of serious 
national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has 
recognized. See, ante, at Perhaps because of the 
intractability of the problem, Congress - vested by the 
Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our 
borders and legislating with respect to aliens - has not 
provided effective leadership in dealing with this 
problem. It therefore is certain that illegal aliens will 
continue to enter the United States and, as the record 
makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will remain 
here. I agree with the Court that their children should 
not be left on the streets uneducated. 
ru. ~.ouoagn c rre c:rna ~og-- I:S no~ peTr:e-c - , oaT 
decision today finds support in decisions of this Court 
with respect to the status of illegitimates. In Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972} we 
said:" .•• visiting ••• condemnation on the head of an 
infant" for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, 
unjust, and "contrary to the basic concept of our system 
that legal burdens should bear some rleationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 
3. 
In this case, the state of Texas effectively 
denies to the school age children of illegal aliens the 
opportunity to attend the free public schools that the 
state generally makes available to all residents. They 
are excluded only because of a status resulting from the 
violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws 
ana -cne ac-e -cna--c -cney r-ema:rn 1n our country unl.awtuily. 
The respondent children are innocent in this respect. 
They could "affect neither their parents' conduct nor 
their own status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 462, 770 
(1977). 
Certainly, our review in a case such as this is 
properly heightened. See Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 430 
U.S., at 767. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190 (1976). 
As Justice Frankfurter said, and as the Court has so often 
repeated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in life 
which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 u.s. 528, 
536 (1953). Our review must not be "toothless" when the 
classification at issue deprives a group of children of 
the opportunity for education afforded all other children 
simply because they have been assigned a legal status due 
4. 
classification that threatens the creation of an 
underclass of future citizens and residents strikes at one 
of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may 
require that the state's interests be substantial and that 
the means bear a "fair and substantial relation" to these 
interests. Cf. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 
412, 415 (1920). 
In my view, the state's denial of education to 
these children bears no substantial relation to any 
substantial state interest. Both of the district courts 
found that an uncertain but significant percentage of 
illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents 
and many eventually will become citizens. The discussion 
by the Court, ante, at ____ , of the state's purported 
interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the 
educational exclusion. Indeed, the interests relied upon 
by the state seem insignificant in view of the 
consequences to the state itself of wholly uneducated 
persons living indefinitely within its borders. By 
5. 
contrast, access to the public schools is made available 
to the children of persons lawfully in this country 
without regard to the temporary nature of residency in the 
particular Texas school district. The Court of Appeals 
and the District Courts that addressed this case concluded 
that the classification could not satisfy even the bare 
requirements of rationality. One need not go so far to 
conclude that the exclusion of respondent's class of 
children from state-orovided education is a type of 
punitive discrimination that is impermissible under 
principles of fairness and equality before the law. 
In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful 
of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens 
and government authorities in Texas and other states 
similarly situated. Their responsibility, if any, for the 
influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the 
ease of entry remains inviting, and the right to deport is 
exercised infrequently by the federal government, the 
additional expense of admitting these children to public 
schools might fairly be shared by the federal and state 
6. 
governments. In any event, it hardly can be argued 
rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within 
our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of 
whom will remain in the state, adding to the problems and 
costs of both state and national governments attendent 
upon unemployment, welfare and crime. 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 
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80-1538 Doe v. Plyler 
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment. 
I join the judgment of the Court. Although I 
agree with a good deal of the Court's opinion, I do not 
join it. Perhaps understandably, the Court undertakes an 
extensive analytical and historical justification of its 
2. 
conclusion that the state's classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. Few provisions in the 
Constitution have prompted as much diverse writing as this 
clause, and perhaps no other provision presents comparable 
difficulties of consistent analysis or in identifying 
limiting principles. I therefore think it advisable to 
view this as the unique case that it is--one quite without 
precedent. 
The classification in question severely 
disadvantages children who are the victims of a 
combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico into 
this country, across our 2, 000 mile border, is readily 
available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens 
are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps 
by other benefits as well. This is a problem of serious 
national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has 
recognized. See ante, at Perhaps because of the 
intractability of the problem, Congress--vested by the 
Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our 
borders and legislating with respect to aliens--has not 
provided effective leadership in dealing with this 
3. 
problem. 1 It therefore is certain that illegal aliens 
will continue to enter the United States and, as the 
record makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will 
remain here. I agree with the Court that their children 
should not be left on the streets uneducated. 
Although the analogy 
~~ today~ support in 
" 
is not perfect, our 
decisions of this Court 
with respect to the status of illegitimates. In Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 u.s. 164, 175 (1972) we 
1Article I, §8, of the Constitution provides that 
"The Congress shall have Power ••• To establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization." The federal government has 
"broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens 
shall be admit ted to the United States, the period they 
may remain, regulation of their conduct before 
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their 
naturalization." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 
U • S . 410 , 419 ( 19 4 8 ) • See Graham v • :RIchardson , 4 0 3 u . S • 
365, 378 (1971) (regulation of aliens IS "constitutionally 
entrusted to the Federal Government"). The Court has 
traditionally shown great deference to federal authority 
over immigration and to federal classifications based upon 
alienage. See, e. g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977) ("it is important to underscore the limited scope 
of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation"); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). Indeed, 
even equal protection analysis in this area is based to a 
large extent on an underlying theme of preemption and 
exclusive federal power over immigration. See Takahashi 
v. Fish ~ Game Comm'n, sui<ra, 334 u.s., at 420 (federal 
government has admitted resident aliens to the country "on 
an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under 
non-discriminatory laws" and the states may not alter the 
terms of this admission). Compare Graham v. Richardson, 
supra, and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 u.s. 634 (1973) with 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 u.s. 67 (1976) and Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 u.s. 88 (1976). Given that the states' power to 
regulate in this area is so limited, and that this is an 
area of such peculiarly strong federal authority , ~;:t=:H~ 
i . 
4. 
said: II • visiting . . condemnation on the head of 
an infant" for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, 
unjust, and "contrary to the basic concept of our system 
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 
In this case, the state of Texas effectively 
denies to the school age children of illegal aliens the 
opportunity to attend the free public schools that the 
state makes available to all residents. They are excluded 
only because of a status resulting from the violation by 
parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact 
that they remain in our country unlawfully. The 
respondent children are innocent in this respect. They 
can "affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own 
status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 462, 770 (1977). 
Certainly, our review in a case such as this is 
properly heightened. 2 See Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 4 30 
~.t~e..<..~ 
2Although I believe that our here should ~ 
be somewhat more searching than in normal equal 
protection case, I do not join in the Cou t's conclusion 
that strict scrutiny is appropriately pplied to the 
classification in this case. 
rJiUiiQPU.id thiK. exacting standard of review ee- instances in 
which a "fundamental" constitutional right or a "suspect" 
classification is present. Neither is clearly present in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
U. S • , at 7 6 7 • C f . Craig v . Boren , 4 2 9 U . S . 19 0 ( 19 7 6 ) . 
As Justice Frankfurter said, and as the Court has so often 
repeated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in life 
which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 u.s. 528, 
536 (1953) (concurring opinion). Our review must not be 
"toothless" when the classification at issue deprives a 
group of children of the opportunity for education 
afforded all other children simply because they have been 
assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their 
this case as the Court reco i zes. In no prior opinion 
has the Court suggested that classification based upon 
illegal alienage is suspect. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
u.s. 67, 80 (1976). Moreover, the Court has reJected the 
view that "there is a right to education explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio 
School District v. Rodrituez, 411 u.s. 1, ~ (1973). 
_ though the Court in Ro r iguez was not faced with the 
complete exclusion of a group of children from education, 
and indeed expressly reserved this question, 411 u.s., at 
36-37, it is not clear to me that the exclusion of illegal 
alien children from public education ought to be viewed as 
violating a fundamental right. The Court in Rodriguez 
indicated that a total denial of education might violate a 
fundamental right because some minimum of education may be 
necessary to the exercise of the franchise and of First 
Amendment rights. How this argument would apply in the 
circumstances of this case is a difficult question that we 
need not decide given that the exclusion does not survive 
under a lesser standard of review. Nor does the Court 
undertake to answer this question. 
Without finding either that a classification 
among children based upon illegal alienage is suspect or 
that a fundamental right has been denied to the children, 
the Court ~ finds strict scrutiny to be the appropriate 
standard of review. I do not think that this is 
consistent wj th our approach in other equal protection 
cases and it ~res±eR~~ shed the constructive discipline 
~ the "su pect classification" and "fundamental right" 
concepts have imposed upon this area of the law. 
6. 
parents. A legislative classification that threatens the 
creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents 
strikes at one of the fundamental purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique circumstances, the 
Court properly may require that the state's interests be 
substantial and that the means bear a "fair and 
substantial relation" to these interests. See Lalli v. 
Lalli, 439 u.s. 259, 265 ("classifications based on 
illegitimacy are invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if they are not substantially related to 
permissible state interests"); Id. at 271 ("As the State's 




In my view, the state's denial of education to 
these children bears no substantial relation to any 
substantial state interest. Both of the district courts 
found that an uncertain but significant percentage of 
illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents 
and many eventually will become citizens. The discussion 
by the Court, ante, at __ , of the state's purported 
interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the 
7. 
educational exclusion. 'Indeed, the interests relied upon 
by the 
~~ 14.~ ·~ l-t.4. i ~h~h-J. 
state A. s ~i:l!nt: ie-aat in view of the 
consequences to the state itself of wholly uneducated 
persons living indefinitely within its borders. By 
contrast, access to the public schools is made available 
to the children of lawful residents without regard to the 
temporary nature of their residency in the particular 
Texas school district. 3 The Court of Appeals and the 
District Courts that addressed this case concluded that 
the classification could not satisfy even the bare 
requirements of rationality. One need not go so far to 
conclude that the exclusion of respondent's class of 
children from state-provided education is a type of 
~ ~ A ,k /;~ 
punitive discrimination that is impermissible under 
/"' ..... . e ·~ ~"'"' l' 1 . , "· 
fEr inciple's of fairness and equality before the law'. J 
In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful 
3The State provides free public education to all 
lawful residents whether they intend to reside permanently 
in the State or are only in the State temporarily. See 
ante, at , n. 29. Of course a school district may 
require that illegal alien children, like any other 
children, actually reside in the school district before 
admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto 
residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any 
principle of equal protection. 
8. 
of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens 
and government authorities in Texas and other states 
similarly situated. Their responsibility, if any, for the 
influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the 
Constitution on the federal government. 4 So long as the 
ease of entry remains inviting, and the power to deport is 
exercised infrequently by the federal government, the 
additional expense of admitting these children to public 
schools might fairly be shared by the federal and state 
governments. In any event, it hardly can be argued 
4In addition, the states' ability to respond on 
their own to the problems caused by this migration is 
limited by the principles of preemption that apply in this 
area. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 u.s. 351 (1976), the Court 
found thata state law making it a criminal offense to 
employ illegal aliens was not preempted by federal 
authority over aliens and immigration. The Court found 
evidence that Congress intended state regulation in this 
area. Moreover, because of the nature of the immigration 7 
system, the state in De Canas was able to identify with 
certainty which aliens had a federal permission to work in 
this country. By contrast, as is evident in this case, it 
is impossible for a state to determine which aliens the 
federal government will eventually deport, which the 
federal government will permit to stay, and which the 
federal government will ultimately naturalize. Until an 
undocumented alien is ordered deported by the federal 
government, no state can be assured that the alien will 
not be found to have a federal permission to reside in the 
country, perhaps even as a citizen. Although the Court 
does not address the question of preemption in this case, 
for the states to predicate discriminatory measures on an ~ 
alien's present or future status under the federal ~ 
immigration laws raises a serious question of preemption 
that casts doubt upon the states' ability to deal with 
this illegal migration in the absence of federal 
direction. 
9. 
rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within 
our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of 
whom will remain in the state, adding to the problems and 
costs of both state and national governments attendent 
upon unemployment, welfare and crime. 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 
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INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES, ET AL., ~ LLANTS 
80-1538 v. --. 
J. AND R. DOE, ET AL. ~~ 
o1~ TEXAS, EL AL., APPELLANTS 80-1934 v. 
CERTAIN NAMED AND UNNAM~~CUMENTED 
ALIEN CHILDRE1~ 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1982] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by these cases is hether, consis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a State may deny to children who are neither 
citizens of the United States nor legally admitted aliens the 
free public education that it offers to all othe children in the 
State. 
I 
Since the late nineteenth century, the United es has 
restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctione 
try into the United States is a crime, 8 U. S. C. § 1325, and ·-----~ 
those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deporta-
tion, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251-1252. But despite the existence of 
80-1538 & 80-1934-0PINION 
2 PLYLER v. DOE 
these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons have 
succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now 
live within various States, including the State of Texas. 
In May 1975, the Texas legislature revised its education 
laws to withhold from local school districts any state funds for 
the education of children who were not "legally admitted" 
into the United States. The 1975 revision also authorized 
local school districts to deny enrollment in their public 
schools to children not "legally admitted" to the country. 
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1981). 1 
These cases involve constitutional challenges to those 
provisions. 
No. 80-1538 
Plyler v. Doe 
This is a class action, filed in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, 
on behalf of certain school-age children of Mexican origin re-
siding in Smith County, Texas, who could not establish that 
'That section provides, in pertinent part: 
"(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted 
aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years 
on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the 
benefits of the Available School Fund for that year. 
"(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or ale-
gally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the 
age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission 
is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district 
in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having 
lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state 
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all per-
sons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens 
and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the 
scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having law-
ful control resides within the school district. " Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§ 21.031. 
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they had been legally admitted into the United States. The 
action complained of the exclusion of plaintiff children from 
the public schools of the Tyler Independent School District. 2 
The Superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees of 
the School District were named as defendants; the State of 
Texas intervened as a party-defendant. After certifying a 
class consisting of all undocumented school-age children of 
Mexican origin residing with the School District, the District 
Court preliminarily enjoined defendants from denying a free 
education to members of the plaintiff class. In December 
1977, the Court conducted an extensive hearing on plaintiffs' 
motion for permanent injunctive relief. 
In considering this motion, the District Court made exten-
sive findings of fact. The court found that neither § 21.031 
nor the School District policy implementing it had "either the 
purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of 
Texas." 458 F. Supp. 569, 575. Respecting defendants' 
further claim that§ 21.031 was simply a financial measure de-
signed to avoid a drain on the State's fisc, the court recog-
nized that the increases in population resulting from the im-
migration of Mexican nationals into the United States had 
created problems for the public schools of the State, and that 
these problems were exacerbated by the special educational 
needs of immigrant Mexican children. The court noted, 
2 Despite the enactment of § 21.031 in 1975, the School District had con-
tinued to enroll undocumented children free of charge until the 1977-1978 
school year. · In July, 1977, it adopted a policy requiring undocumented 
children to pay a "full tuition fee" in order to enroll. Section 21.031 had 
not provided a definition of "a legally admitted alien." Tyler offered the 
following clarification: 
"A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is 
legally in the United States, or a person who is in the process of securing 
documentation from the United States Immigration Service, and the Serv-
ice will state that the person is being processed and will be admitted with 
proper documentation." App. to Juris. Statement in No. 8{}-1538, at p. 
38. 
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however, that the increase in school enrollment was primar-
ily attributable to the admission of children who were legal 
residents. I d., at 575-576. It also found that while the "ex-
clusion of all undocumented children from the public schools 
in Texas would eventually result in economies at some level," 
id., at 576, funding from both the state and federal govern-
ments was based primarily on the number of children en-
rolled. In net effect then, barring undocumented children 
from the schools would save the State money, but it would 
"not necessarily" improve "the quality of education." I d., at 
577. The court further observed that the impact of§ 21.031 
was borne primarily by a very small sub-class of illegal aliens, 
"entire families who have migrated illegally and-for all prac-
tical purposes-permanently to the United States." Id., at 
578. 3 Finally, the court noted that under current laws and 
practices "the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien 
of tomorrow," 4 and that without an education, these undocu-
mented children, "[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of pov-
erty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial 
prejudices, ... will become .permanently locked into the low-
est socio-economic class." I d., at 577. 
The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to 
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that § 21.031 violated that Clause. 
3 The court contrasted this group with those illegal aliens who entered 
the country alone in order to earn money to send to their dependents in 
Mexico, and who in many instances remained in this country for only a 
short period of time. 458 F. Supp., at 578. 
' Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Gilbert Cardenas, testified that "fifty to sixty 
per cent . . . of current legal alien workers were formerly illegal aliens. " 
458 F. Supp., at 577. A defense witness, Rolan Heston, District Director 
of the Houston District of I. N. S. , testified that "undocumented children 
can and do live in the United States for years, and adjust their status 
through marriage to a citizen or permanent resident. " Ibid. The court 
also took notice of congressional proposals to "legalize" the status of many 
unlawful entrants. !d. , at 577-578. See also n. 15, infra. 
80-1538 & 80-1934-0PINION 
PLYLER v. DOE 5 
Suggesting that "the state's exclusion of undocumented chil-
dren from its public schools ... may well be the type of in-
vidiously motivated state action for which the suspect classi-
fication doctrine was designed," the court held that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the statute would survive a 
"strict scrutiny" analysis because the discrimination embod-
ied in the statute was not, in any event, supported by a ra-
tional basis. I d., at 585. The District Court also concluded 
that the Texas statute violated the Supremacy Clause. 5 I d., 
at 590-592. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Dis-
trict Court's injunction. 628 F. 2d 448 (1980). The Court of 
Appeals held that the District Court had erred in finding the 
Texas statute preempted by federal law.6 With respect to 
equal protection, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed in 
all essential respects the analysis of the District Court, id., at 
454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm 
regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational 
basis standard or some more stringent test," id., at 458. 
We noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1981). 
No. 80-1934 
In Re: Alien Children Litigation 
During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutional-
ity of§ 21.031 and various local practices undertaken on the 
5 The court found § 21.031 inconsistent with the scheme of national regu-
lation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and with federal laws 
pertaining to funding and discrimination in education. The court distin-
guished DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), by emphasizing that the 
state bar on employment of illegal aliens involved in that case mirrored 
precisely the federal policy, of protecting the domestic labor market, 
underlying the immigration laws. The court discerned no express federal 
policy to bar illegal immigrants from education. 458 F. Supp., at 590-592. 
6 The Court of Appeals noted that De Canas v. Bica, supra, had not 
foreclosed all state regulation with respect to illegal aliens, and found no 
express or implied congressional policy favoring the education of illegal 
aliens. The court therefore concluded that there was no preemptive con-
flict between state and federal law. 628 F. 2d, at 451-454. 
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authority of that provision were filed in the United States 
District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern 
Districts of Texas. Each suit named the State of Texas and 
the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local 
officials. In November, 1979, the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation, on motion of the State, consolidated the 
claims against the State officials into a single action to be 
heard in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March 
1980. In July 1980, the court entered an opinion and order 
holding that § 21.031 violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 501 F. Supp. 544. 7 The court 
held that "the absolute deprivation of education should trig-
ger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute 
deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the 
desired benefit." I d., at 582. The court determined that 
the State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling 
state interest, id., at 583-583; that exclusion of these children 
had not been shown to be necessary to improve education 
within the State, id., at 583; and that the educational needs of 
the children statutorily excluded was not different from the 
needs of children not excluded, id., at 583. The court there-
fore concluded that § 21.031 was not carefully tailored to ad-
vance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner. 
I d., at 583-583. While appeal of the District Court's deci-
sion was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision 
in No. 81-1538. Apparently on the strength of that opinion, 
the Court of Appeals, on February 23, 1981, summarily 
affimed the decision of the Southern District. We noted 
probable jurisdiction, -- U. S. -- (1981), and consoli-
dated this case with No. 81-1538 for briefing and argument. 8 
7 The court concluded that § 21.031 was not preempted by federal laws or 
international agreements. 501 F. Supp. 544, 584-596. 
8 Appellees in both cases continue to press the argument that § 21.031 is 
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II 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall 
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to a~ris­
dicti n the e ual protection of the laws." Appellants argue 
at the outset at un ocumen e a iens, because of their im-
migration status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of 
the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to 
the equal protection of Texas law. We reject this argument. 
Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien 
is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. 
Aliens, even l:!:liens whose presence in this country is unlaw-
ful, have longl?een recognized as "persons" guaranteed due 
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206,212 (1953); Wong Wing 
v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, we have clearly held 
that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in 
this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the 
Federal Government. 9 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 
(1976). 
Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing 
that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its 
protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' 
view, persons who have entered the United States illegally 
preempted by federal law and policy. In light of our disposition of the 
Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no occasion to reach this claim. 
• It would be incongruous to hold that the United States, to which the 
Constitution assigns a broad authority over both naturalization and foreign 
affairs, is barred from invidious discrimination with respect to unlawful 
aliens, while exempting the States from a similar limitation. See 426 
U. S., at 84-86. 
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are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are 
present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. 
Neither our cases nor the logic and history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment supports that constricting construction of the 
phrase, "within its jurisdiction." 10 We have never suggested 
that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the 
equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that 
of due process. To the contrary, we have recognized that 
both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of 
persons, and to reach every exercise of State authority. 
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not 
confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
10 Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of 
this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States .... " (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writ-
ing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), 
detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the pre-
dominantly geographic sense in which the term "jurisdiction" was used. 
He further noted that it was "impossible to construe the words 'subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdic-
tion,' in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons 
'within the jurisidiction' of one of the States of the Union are not 'subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States.'" !d., at 687. 
Justice Grey concluded that "Every citizen or subject of another coun-
try, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and 
consequently within the jurisdiction of the United States." !d., at 693. 
As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geo-
graphic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty 
and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amend-
ment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into 
the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlaw-
ful. See C. Bouve', Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United 
States 425-427 (1912). 
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
These provisions are universal in their application, to 
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without 
regard to any differences of race color, or of nationality; 
and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protec-
tion of equal laws." Yick Wo, supra, 118 U. S., at 369 
(emphasis added). 
In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the 
United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may in-
voke the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to challenge actions of 
the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understand-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford 
its protection to all within the boundaries of a State. Wong 
Wing, supra, 163 U. S., at 238. 11 Our cases applying the 
Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme: 12 
11 In his separate opinion, {ustice Field addressed the relationship be-
tween the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment: 
"The term 'person,' used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to in-~ 
elude any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. 
A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws 
that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country 
in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws. . . . The contention that persons within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the law 
was heard with pain on the argument at the bar-in face of the great con-
stitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U. S., at 242-243 (concurring and dissenting). 
12 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185 (1958) , relied on by appellants , 
is not to the contrary. In that case the Court held, as a matter of statu-
tory construction, that an alien paroled into the United States pursuant to 
§ 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5), 
was not "within the United States" for the purpose of availing herself of 
.§ 243(h), which authorized the witholding of deportation in certain circum-
stances. The conclusion reflected the longstanding distinction between 
exclusion proceedings, involving the determination of admissibility, and 
deportation proceedings. The undocumented children who are appellees 
10 
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"Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the pro-
tection of equal laws can be performed only where its 
laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is 
there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. 
That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the 
States severally as governmental entities,-each respon-
sible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties 
of persons within its borders." Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 350 (1938). 
There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that I 
"due process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal pro-
tection," and therefore available to a larger class of persons. 
To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment 
reflects an elementary limitation on state power. To per-
mit a State to employ the phrase "within its jurisdiction" to 
identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as be-
yond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation 
to assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to 
those persons, would undermine the principal purpose for 
which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause was 
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-
and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fun-
damentally at odds with the power asserted by the State 
here, to define a class of persons subject to its laws as none-
theless excepted from its protection. 
Although the congressional debate concerning § 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly con-
firms the understanding that the phrase "within its jurisdic-
tion" was intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of 
equal protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to all 
here, unlike the parolee in Leng May Ma, supra, could apparently be re-
moved from the country only pursuant to deportation proceedings. 8 
U. S. C. § 1251(a)(2). See 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration 
Law and Procedure, § 3.16b, at 3-161 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its 
laws. Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, 
by using the phrase, "person within its jurisdiction," sought 
expressly to ensure that the equal protection of the laws was 
provided to the alien population. Representative Bingham 
reported to the House the draft resolution of the Joint Com-
mittee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (H.R. 63), which was to 
become the Fourteenth Amendment. Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866). Two days later, Bingham 
posed the following question in support of the resolution: 
"Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it 
not essential to the unity of the Government and the 
unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or 
strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection 
in every State in this Union in the rights of life and lib-
erty and property?" I d., at 1090. 13 
Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of 
Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Sen-
ate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the 
Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions appli-
cable to all who "may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of 
a State: 
"The last two clauses of the first section of the amend-
ment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen 
of the United States, but any person, whoever he may 
be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the 
13 Representative Bingham's views are also reflected in his comments on 
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. He repeatedly referred to the need to pro-
vide protection, not only to the freedmen, but to "the alien and stranger," 
and to "refugees ... and all men." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
1292 (1866). 
12 
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laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in 
the States, and does away with the injustice of subject-
ing one caste of persons to a code not applicable to an-
other. . . . It will, if adopted by the States, forever dis-
able every one of them from passing laws trenching upon 
those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to 
citizens of the United States, and to all persons who 
may happen to be within their jurisdiction." Cong. 
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (emphasis 
added). 
Use of the phrase, "within its jurisidiction," thus does not 
detract from, out rather confirms, the understanding th~ the 
protection of tfie F'ourteentfi Amendment extends to an one, 
citizen or s ranger, w o ts su Jec o the aws of a State, and 
reaches into every corner Of a Staters territory. 'That a per-
son's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was 
unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot 
negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's terri-
torial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the 
full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and crim-
inal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction-either volun-
tarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution 
and laws of the United States-he is entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws that a State may choose to establish. 
Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in 
thesecasesmay claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection only besi!l§. the iJ.!9U~. 
The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection 
Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State of Texas 
to reimburse local school boards for the education of children 
who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the 
United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school 
boards of the burden of tuition on those children. It is to 
this question that we now turn. 
... 
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III 
The Equal Protection Clause requires that "aJY persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." vF. S. Roy-
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). But 
so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are 
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they 
were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). 
The initial discretion to determine what is "different," and 
what is "the same," resides in the legislatures of the States. 
A legislature must have a substantial latitude to establish 
classifications that in its view most closely approximate the 
nature of the particular problem perceived, accommodate 
competing concerns both public and private, and account for 
limitations on the State's ability to remedy every ill. In ap-
plying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state ac-
tion, we have thus required only that the classificatigp. at 
issue bear a rational relationhrP to 'sotne legitimate lie 
purpose. ee, e. g., ~ liamson v. ee Optical Co., 348 
1J.'S:'"' 483, 488-489 (1955). 
But we would.-!!Q.t be faithful to our obligations under the 
Fourteenth Amendment if we apj>lied so deferential a stan-
dard to every form of legiSlative action. Where a classifica-
tion dfsadVailtagesa "suspect class," or impinges on the exer-
cise of a "fundamental right," and thus strikes at the core of 
constitutional concern, we have found it necessary, and con-
sistent with the primary purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause, to subject the legislative classification to a closer 
scrutiny-one that seeks the assurance that the classi:fiCaTI'On 
hasoeen narrowly conceived to meet an important and legiti-
mate state interest. 
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals below held that 
Texas' classification failed to meet even the "rational basis" 
test, appellees press their contention that the Texas scheme 
should be subjected to something more than "minimal scru-
tiny," relying alternatively on the "suspect class" and "funda-
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mental rights" lines of cases. 14 l\£pellees concede that the 
cl~ss of undocumented children disabled by § 21.031 does not 
fall neatlililto an~ suspect class fiientified by our prior qold-
ings. And tliey furtfier concede tfiat we have rejected the 
argument that education is a "fundamental right," such that 
the State must justify by compelling necessity every varia-
tion in the manner in which it is provided to its population. 
See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 
28-39 (1973). We find in the history and purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment a clear direction with res ect to the 
l ve o scru my appropna e or review of § 21.031. More-
over, we cone u e t at, m e con ext o an absolute denial of 
education to a discrete class of children, the nature of both 
the classification and the interest denied, are integral to our 
assessment. Nevertheless, we take in turn appellee's argu-
ments for heightened scrutiny based alternatively on our 
"suspect clatsl' ·or "fundamental rights" cases. 
A 
Several formulations explain our treatment of certain legis-
"Appellees' argument for heightened scrutiny has proceeded on several 
fronts. In addition to the claim that the class of ille al aliens shoul be 
deemed c~~~t, a question we o not ec1 e, see n. 18, 
infra; '3:ppelleesargue heretliat the tu1tion charge assessed by the School 
District upon undocumented children discriminates on the basis of wealth. 
) 
In light of the fact that this tuition charge is discriminaton'ly applied, we do 
not address the question of the 22,tential disparate im~act of a uniform tu-
ition charge on persons with varying econom1c capabiht1es. 
~cMion,~ appellees in No. su:tsgs nmtally argued that § 21.031 
effected a discrimination on the basis of national origin. That claim 
"dropped out" at trial, 458 F . Supp., at 572 n. 4, and formed no part of the 
decision of either the District Court or Court of Appeals in that case. In 
No. 80-1934, the claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin 
formed the predicate, under 42 U. S. C. 2000h-2, for the intervention of 
the United States. It was rejected by the District Court, 501 F. Supp., at 
56&-567, 573-574, and consideration of that claim was not reflected in the 
Court of Appeals' summary affirmance. The United States has not 
pressed that claim in this Court. See Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae in No. 1538 and..for the United States in 80-1934, at &-6, n. 3. 
\ 
... 
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lative classifications as "suspect." Some classifications are ..._________ 
em irically more likely than others to reflect deep-seated 
~dice ra er than egis a 1ve rationality in pursuit of 
someTegitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such 
prejudice is well recognized as incompatible with the con-
stitutional understanding that each erson is to be judged in-
dividually and is entitled to equal justice under the law. 
Classifications treated as suspect also tend to be those that 
are least likely to be relevant to any proper legislative goal. 
See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Finally, 
certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have histori-
cally been "relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process." San Ant_smio School District v . 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971); see United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938). In afford-
ing rigorous scrutiny to classifications adversely affecting 
"discrete and insular minorities"-relatively small in num-
ber, identifiable by immutable or nearly immutable personal 
attributes or status, habitually victimized-we afford no judi-
cial preference to their condition. The experience of our N a-
tion has shown us that prejudice may manifest itself in the 
le~~!' treatment of some groups. Our response to 
that expenence is encapsulated in the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation impos-
ing special disabilities upon such historically disfavored 
groups thus suggests precisely the kind of "class or caste" 
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
abolish. 
Lax enforcement of the law barring entry into this coun-
try, coupled with a refusal to create an effective bar to the 
employment of illegal aliens, has resulted in the creation of a 
16 
substantial ' adow population' of illegal aliens within our 
Nation's borde .15 ation evokes the specter of a 
permanent caste of persons, encouraged to remain here as a 
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits 
that our society makes available to citizens and lawful resi-
dents. 16 Such a class displays many of the characteristics of 
those "discrete and insular" minorities for which the Equal 
Protection Clause has historically offered a special 
solicitude. 17 
15 The Attorney General recently estimated the number of illegal aliens 
within the United States at between 3 and 6 million. In presenting to both 
the Senate and House of Representatives several presidential proposals for 
reform of the immigration laws-including one to "legalize" many of the il-
legal entrants currently residing in the United States by creating for them 
a special status under the immigration laws-the Attorney General noted 
that this subclass is largely composed of persons with a ermanent attach-
men o t e are un 1 e y to be displaced from our 
temtory: 
"We have neither the resources, the capability, nor the motivation to up-
root and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in 
effect, members of the community. By granting limited legal status to the 
productive and law-abiding members of this shadow population, we will 
recognize reality ancJ, devote our enforcement resources to deterring future 
illegal arrivals." ~estimony of William French Smith, Attorney General, 
Before Senate Subcommitte on Immigration and Refugee Policy and House 
Subcommitte on Immigration, Refugees and Int'l Law (July 30, 1981). 
16 As the District Court observed in No. 80-1538, the confluence of gov-
ernment policies has resulted in 
"the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens , such as the par-
ents of plaintiffs in this case , whose presence is tolerated, whose employ-
ment is perhaps even welcomed , but who are virtually defenseless against 
any abuse , exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the state's 
natural citizens and business organizations may wish to subject them." 
458 F . Supp., at 585. 
" We need not labor over historical materials before acknowledging that 
~ave been "saddled with such disabilities," and "subjected to such a 
~y of unequal treatment ," and "relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritar-
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The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special 
members of this class of illegal inhabitants. P~rsuasive ar-
guments suggest that state legislatures enjoy unusual pre- · _ . ~ 
rogatives with respect to persons whose presence within the tJ1, ~
boundaries of the United States is the product of their unlaw-
ful entry.'8 These arguments do not apply with the same 
ian political process." San Antonio School District, supra, 411 U. S., at 
28. Many of the reasons that have prompted us to regard resident .ru!ens 
a~~~~ of a arscrete and msular minonfy ... for whom ... 
hefghteneajumcia sohc1tu e 1s appropriate," Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S., at 372, a ly with even greaterforce to ill a! aliens. Lawfully res-
ident aliens argua y ave some access to political forums, if only in an ad-
visory capacity, and may freely avail themselves of the judicial process. 
In contrast, illegal aliens are understandably reluctant to risk exposure by 
bringing their complaints to the attention of public agencies and law en-
forcement authorities, whether those complaints are a direct result of dis-
criminatory treatment by virtue of immigration status, or arise from some 
less invidious source. 
18 Several factors suggest that "illegal aliens" in_£eneral should not. be 
deemed a "suspect class." Unlike most of the classrilcatwns that we have 
recogriiZeaassuspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this 
country, is the roduct ofv luna action. Indeed, entry into the class is 
itself a crime. n a rtion, it cou ardly be suggested that the status of 
"illegal alienage" is irrelevant to every legislative action. With respect to 
the actions of the federal government, alienage classifications may be inti-
mately related to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative 
to control access to the United States, and to the plenary federal power to 
detennine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citi-
zen of the Nation. No State may independently exercise a like power. 
But if the Federal Government has by unifonn rule prescribed what it be-
lieves to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, 
the states may, of course, follow the federal direction. Nor are the states 
wholly without power to meet legitimate demographic and economic con-
cerns arising from a potential influx of persons from outside this country. 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976). We have no need in this case to 
resolve the difficult problem that might be presented by the application of 
equal protection standards to state classifications based on illegal alienage 
generally, or with respect to other state created rights. We hold only that 
in the context of§ 21.031's absolute denial of education to the discrete class 
of undocumented children, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of 
review. 
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force to classifications imposing particular disabilities on the 
children of such unlawful entrants. Those who choose to en- ~ 
ter our territory by stealth and in violation of law might be tJ1r ~ 
asked to bear the burden of legislation designed to deter their 
unlawful entry.'9 The children of those persons are hardly 
similarly situated. e1r parents ave t e a 1 1ty to con-
form t11eifccmauct to societal norms," and indeed possess the 
power to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the 
State of Texas; the children who are plaintiffs in these cases I ~ 
"can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own sta-
tus." vTrimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977). 
Equally important, even if the State found it efficacious to at-
tempt to control the conduct of adults by acting against their 
children, legislation directing the onus of parent's misconduct 
on his children does not comport well with our most funda-
mental conceptions of justice. 
"[V]isiting ... condemnation on the head of an infant is 
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on 
the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our sys-
tem that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the . . . 
child is an ineffectual,Las well as unjust-way of deter-
ring the parent." ~eber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
It surely cannot be said that undocumented status is con-
'
9 The courts below noted the ineffectiveness of the Texas provision as a 
means of controlling the influx of illegal entrants into the State. See Doe 
v. Plyler, 628 F . 2d, at 460-461 ; 458 F. Supp., at 585; In re Alien Children 
Education Litigation , 501 F. Supp. , at 578-579 ("the evidence demon-
strates that undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free 
public education. Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come 
into this country seek employment opportunities and not educational bene-
fits. . . . There was overwhelming evidence . . . of the unimportance of 
public education as a stimulus for immigration.") (footnote omitted). 
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stitutionally irrelevant to any proper legislative goal of the 
State of Texas. Further, the characteristic deemed decisive 
under the Texas scheme, migration status, is not absolutely 
immutable, since it is the product of someone's conscious ac-
tion. These considerations mi_!itate somewhat against __ af-
fordin discriminations against tlie class or undocumented 
chi~~ my. evertheless, immigration 
status is a charactenstlc over which the undocumented chil-
dren who are most directly affected by§ 21.031 have little or 
no control. The classification at issue in the Texas scheme } 
disadvantages a discrete clasSOf "'cliildren characterized by 
sue powe essness an vu nera I y as IS associated with 
the need or mtensi e e tlon scrutiny. The un-
usual character o t is class cautions against prescribing 
some standard of judicial review to be applied to it in all cir-
cumstances. But it suffices for the moment to acknowledge 
the presence of many of the factors suggesting that legisla-
tion disabling this discrete class of undocumented children is 
in the nature of "class or caste" legislation with which the the 
Equal Protection Clause is most emphatically concerned. 
With these observations in mind, we turn our attention to the 
state-created right to which these children claim an equal 
entitlement. 
B 
Appellees base a second claim to strict scrutiny on the as-
sertion, not at issue in San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez, supra, at 37, that absolute denial of basic education 
represents an interference with "fundamental rights." In 
determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right 
is deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, we look first to the Constitution to see if the 
right infringed has its source therein. But we have also rec-
ognized the fundamentality of participation in state "elections 
on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction," 
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 336, even though "the right to 
80-1538 & 80-1934-0PINION 
20 PLYLER v. DOE 
vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right." San 
Antonio School District, 411, U. S. at 35, n. 78. We have 
explained the need for strict scrutiny in matters involving 
suffrage as evolving from the significance of the franchise as 
the guardian of all other rights. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U. S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 
(1886). That synthesis does not, however, represent a judi-
cial exercise in public policy formation. The decision to sub-
ject state classifications in a particular legislative context to 
the rigorous requirement of strict scrutiny is legitimate only 
so long as it reflects some special objective of the Nation in 
adopting the Equal Protection Clause. It is from this per-
spective that we approach our analysis of the interest af- ..,._/ ... , J . L/,. 
fected by § 21.031. o, ~ -y 
Education is not among the rights explicitl aranteed by 
the ConstitutiOn. qn n onw c oo !:§. net, supra, at 35. 
Butundeniably the "American people have always regarded 
education and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of su-
preme importance," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 400 
(1923), and "the public school as a most vital civic institution 
for the preservation of a democratic system of government." 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). "[S]ome degree ofeduca-~ 
tion is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively . 
and intelligently in our open politic~ystem if we are re-
serve freedom and independence.'\ Wisconsin v. Yoder 1!06 
U. S. 205, 221 (1972). And we have recently obse d that 
"[t]hese perceptions of the public schoo-ls-as-incu!cating fun-
damental values necessary to the maintenance of a demo-
cratic political system have been confirmed by the observa-
tions of social scientists." Ambach v. Nonvick, 441 U. S. 
68, 77 (1979). Not alone does the child deprived of an educa- ~  
tion suffer the inability to participate effectively in our civic 
and cultural institutions; our Nation suffers too when select 
groups are denied the opportunity to contribute to the com-
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munity of ideas within which freedom and democracy thrive. 20 
While the benefit of education to the political and cultural 
community of our Nation is substantial, it is to be remem-
bered that the Equal Protection Clause was desi ed to ro-
tect individuals. a lause was mtended to abolish those 
d~ governmental barriers that stood as an obsta-
cle to personal advancement on the basis of individual merit 
and that deprived persons of opportunity because of the cir-
cumstances of their birth. "(E]ducation prepares individuals 
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, at 221. In this society, the pub-
lic schools provide the primary vehicle by which individual 
initiative and merit are allowed to overcome the circum-
stances of birth. The interest in public education we identi-
fied 28 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 (1954), has not diminished over time: 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for educa-
tion both demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
20 Because the State does not afford noncitizens the right to vote, and 
may limit to citizens the right to participate in matters central to the 
State's political community, appellants argue that denial of a basic educa-
tion to these children is of less significance than the denial to some other 
group. Whatever the current status of these children, the courts below 
concluded that many will eventually become citizens. The fact that many 
will not is not decisive , even with respect to the importance of education to 
participation in core political institutions. "[T]he benefits of education are 
not reserved to those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty 
.. .. " 458 F. Supp., at 581, n. 14. In addition, although a noncitizen 
"may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a 
role-perhaps even a leadership role-in other areas of import to the com-
munity." Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1, 12 (1977). Finally, we ob-
serve that the significance of education to our society is not limited to its 
political and cultural fruits. The public schools are an important socializ-
ing institution, imparting those shared values through which social order, 
and stabilty, are maintained. 
22 
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of education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in pre-
paring him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." !d., at 493 (emphasis 
added). 
The debates and actions of the Reconstruction Congress 
clearly reflect both aspects of educational need: first, the im-
portance of basic education as a means of advancing the mate-
rial and spiritual well-being of the individual, and second, the 
Nation's need for education in fulfulling its constitutional 
commitment to equality and in preserving an-orderly demo-
cratic society. 21 Indeed, if the views of the proponents of 
that Amendment can be taken as evidence, it is clear that 
education as an ingredient of social equality, and the desire to 
ensure that there be no class-based discrimination in its pro-
vision, lay near the core of the Nation's concern. 22 
21 In Brown v. Board of Education we found the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment's adoption "inconclusive" in determining the effect of 
the Amendment on segregated public schools. 347 U. S. , at 489-490. 
The present inquiry is different. We look here to to the significance of 
education within the framework of national reform following the Civil War 
as revealed in the congressional debates. We find a clear consensus that 
basic education for the freedman was of special constitutional significance, 
and that class-based discrimination by state educational insitutions was 
clearly intended to be proscribed. 
22 As soon as the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened, Senator Wilson intro-
duced a bill designed to restrain enforcement of the the Black Codes. He 
explained the urgent need for such legislation to ensure that the "man 
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In a speech supporting his introduction of the initial prod-
uct of the Committee of Fifteen's efforts toward what was to 
become the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Bing-
ham despaired of a legal system that had reduced men "to a 
level with the brutes of the field, ... condemning them to toil 
without reward, to live without knowledge, and die without 
hope." Gong. Globe, 39th Gong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). The 
congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not focus on the Equal Protection Clause. But concern for 
equal access to education is clearly revealed in the remarks of 
those Senators who did address its intended effect. Senator 
Howe of Wisconsin spoke of the need for the Amendment in 
terms of the type of discriminatory laws imposed in the wake 
of abolition, citing the manner in which one State had pur-
ported to provide "for the education of her colored popula-
tion." Gong. Globe, 39th Gong., 1st Sess., App. 219 (1866). 23 
On June 8, 1866, very shortly before the Amendment was 
approved by the Senate, Senator Henderson of Missouri de-
scribed the recent actions in the South that, in his view, ne-
cessitated its passage. Again, denial of education was cited: 
made free by the Constitution of the United States ... is a freeman in-
deed; . . . that he can go into the schools and educate himself and his chil-
dren. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 111 (emphasis added). 
Senator Wilson's bill was apparently withdrawn when the Senate took 
up consideration of a bill to extend the Freedmen's Bureau. The debates 
on that bill also reflect the importance of education within the plan of re-
construction. See I d., at 586, 590 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Donnelly). See 
also S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 (1865) (Report of 
Major General Carl Schurz on Conditions of the South, documenting re-
sistance to education for the freedman. ). 
23 Senator Howe queried his colleagues in the following terms: 
"I have submitted to you one of the statutes in one of these States ... 
touching one of the great interests not only of this colored population but of 
the State itself, and I ask you ... if ... you dare hesitate to put in the 
Constitution of the United States a positive inhibition upon exercising this 
power of local government to sanction such a crime as I have just por-
trayed." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess., App. 219 (1866). 
24 
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"The South saw its opportunity and promptly collected 
together all the elements of prejudice and hatred against 
the negro for puposes of future party power. They de-
nied him the right to hold real or personal property, ex-
cluded him from their courts as a witness, denied him the 
means of education, and forced upon him unequal bur-
dens. Though nominally free, so far as discriminating 
legislation could make him so he was yet a slave." 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (emphasis 
added). 
Subsequent congressional actions confirm the importance 
of basic education within the framework of equality that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to promote. One of 
the clearest illustrations of the extraordinary regard with 
which the Nation then held education as a tool of equality-
and the Nation's understanding of the appropriate limits of 
Fourteenth Amendment intrusion on the prerogatives of the 
States with respect to the provision of education-is to be 
found in the debates concerning the readmission of the for-
mer Confederate States. In requiring the former States of 
the Confederacy to reapply for readmission to Congress upon 
fulfillment of certain conditions, Congress perceived its role 
as ensuring that the constitutions of the readmitted states es-
tablished a republican form of government, and conformed 
"with the Constitution of the United States." Reconstruc-
tion Act of March 2, 1867, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429. 24 
u The Fortieth Congress considered a Supplementary Bill on Re-
construction in March, 1867. A last-minute amendment was proposed to 
require any State seeking readmission to include in its constitution a guar-
antee that the State would maintain free public schools, open to all without 
regard to race. The amendment was defeated by an equally divided vote 
of the Senate. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 165-170 (1867). The 
debates on that provision confirm Congress' view of education as a core ele-
ment in the framework of Fourteenth Amendment equality-and further 
illustrate the continuing congressional concern for state sovereignty that 
moderated federal intervention into the field of education. 
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The State of Virgini~ included in her constitution a guaran-
tee barling racial discrimination with respect to suffrage, 
jury service, and participation in the school fund or school 
privileges. The House was concerned that political forces 
within the State might seek to repeal those provisions after 
Virginia gained reentry. Debate focused on language in the 
readmission bill barring such a change. 25 H.R. 783, Cong. 
Senator Howe, who endorsed the amendment, had earlier noted that he 
"would be sorry to find an American Senator who would stand up in the 
face of our recent experiences and deny that education is essential to the 
national welfare .... " Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1867), and 
emphatically declared that if any State seeking readmission "should show 
me in any one of their organized Jaws a single provision denying the right 
to education to any portion of the people in those districts ... I should sit 
here until the walls of this Capitol rotted down before I would vote to re-
clothe such a community with the prerogatives of a State." Id., at 71. 
Senator Morton thought it "the very essence of reconstruction that these 
people shall be educated .... The education of the people is essential to the 
execution of the guarantee that we shall secure to each State a republican 
form of government." Id., at 69; see id., at 168. And Senator Sumner, 
who introduced the amendment, ventured the opinion that if the Southern 
States had freely provided education to their white population, they would 
never have rebelled. "A population that could not read and write natu-
rally failed to comprehend and appreciate a republican government." Id., 
at 167; see id., at 50, 165-167. But the further debate, and the fate of that 
measure, suggest the need for a more cautious approach to federal involve-
ment in state fiscal arrangements with respect to education. See n. 28, 
infra. 
25 lt provided, in pertinent part: 
"That the constitution of said State shall never be so amended or changed 
as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right 
to vote or hold office ... or to prevent any person on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude from serving as a juror or participating 
equally in the school fund or school privileges provided for in said con-
stitution." See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. , 2d Sess. 362 (1870) (emphasis 
added). 
The Virginia readmission bill initially passed by the House did not in-
clude these conditions, id., at 502-503, but they were restored in the Sen-
ate, id. , at 643, and the House concurred, id., at 720; see Act of Jan. 26 
1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63. 
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Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870). Several Representa-
tives described these "fundamental conditions" as essential to 
a republican form of government. 26 Representative Scofield 
perceived the guarantee of equal education and equal fran-
chise as a vital element in the policies that had guided the Re-
publican Party through the period of reconstruction. '1:1 Selec-
26 Representative Scofield stated that "this new constitution of Virginia 
has very wisely provided for equal franchise and equal education in that 
Commonwealth . .. . I regard the [bill] as ... an intimation ... that we 
look upon those features of their constitution as the features that make it 
republican in form." Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 500 (1870); see id., 
at 485 (remarks of Rep. Ward) ("[S]o long as you secure the jury-box, the 
ballot-box, and school privileges to the colored people of Virginia ... you 
will have there a republican form of government.") 
27 The same "fundamental conditions" were imposed on Mississippi, Act 
of Feb. 23, 1870, 16 Stat. 67, 68, and on Texas, Act of March 30, 1870, 16 
Stat. 80, 81, in readmitting each to representation. 
The Mississippi readmission bill, including the equal education provision, 
was vehemently debated in the Senate. Senator Howard sought to sup-
port the "fundamental conditions" as necessary for a republican form of 
government. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1218 (1870). Senator 
Thurman pressed the argument that since neither universal suffrage nor 
universal education was made a test of a republican form of government by 
the Framers of the Constitution, and since both were unknown at the time 
the Constitution was adopted, the Congress had no authority to impose 
such conditions. Ibid. Three days later, Senator Howard responded to 
Senator Thurman's position: 
"Now sir, ifthere be any one proposition more generally admitted than an-
other among American citizens, politicians, and statesmen, it is that in 
order to uphold and maintain a republican form of government such as is 
understood and practiced on this continent, the diffusion of knowledge by 
means of primary schools is the greatest, the safest, and the most effectual 
instrument." Id., at 1253. 
Senator Norton then responded to the suggestion that "in guarantying to 
a State a republican form of government now, we cannot go beyond the 
definition of a republican form of government in 1787." !d. , at 1254. He 
argued that basic constitutional conceptions had been changed by the re-
cent amendments: 
"I controvert the position that this clause means the same thing now in the 
I 
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tive denial of education meant continued oppression. The 
equal provision of education would "destroy all hope of the 
restoration of slavery." !d., at 500 (remarks of Rep. 
Scofield). 
The history of the Reconstruction Congress also suggests 
that among those who were fundamentally in accord with the 
broad principles of abolition and reform embodied in the 
Equal Protection Clause, many nonetheless hesitated before 
imposing upon the States the constitutional or federal statu-
tory duty, and fiscal burden, of establishing a statewide sys-
tem of public education. 28 Even as the Fourteenth Amend-
Constitution that it did in 1787, because every amendment that is put into 
that instrument which is in conflict with an existing clause modifies and 
changes the meaning of that existing clause .. . . 
" ... I will ask my friend from Minnesota, in securing a republican govern-
ment in the State of Mississippi, what better means can we employ than 
the universal education of that people? 
"I reply to the argument of the Senator from Ohio, that the definition of 
a republican form of Government once consistent with the slavery of one 
half or two thirds of the people; once consistent with the denial of civil 
rights to one half of the people; once consistent with the denial of education 
and of protection to a majority of the people, has been changed by the re-
peated amendments of the constitution, and such a Government would now 
be utterly inconsistent with a republican form of government as defined by 
the Constitution of the United States." I d. , at 1254-1255. 
28 The debate concerning the last-minute amendment to the Supplemen-
tary Bill on Reconstruction, see n. 24, supra, illustrates the concerns for 
State sovereignty that counseled against imposing on the States an affir-
mative obligation to finance public education. For example, Senator Pat-
terson, who supported imposition of a universal education provision on the 
readmitted States, noted that in principle he would favor a similar require-
ment imposed on the States of the Union-if such a requirement were not 
unconstitutional. He was also concerned about the difficulty of supporting 
such a program through taxation. 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1867). Sen-
ator Williams, who voted against the amendment, was concerned about the 
financial accountability of the States. I d., at 169. Senator Frelinghuysen 
I 
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ment was reshaping the structure of our federal system with 
respect to the preservation of individual rights, these con-
cerns for state sovereignty persisted, and tempered the im-
petus toward compelling the states to provide public educa-
tion as the cure for the Nations' ills. But it was clearly l 
recognized by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that class-basea aenTals of 6asH! eaucatiOnwereWhOify in-
compatible witli tlie framework of equality emfiodied in that 
A m u ng t dema of e ucation to selected 
groups was identified as an historical tool of political oppres-
sion and social subjugation. Education was affirmatively 
identified as vital to the advancement of the individual. 
Education was cited as the basis upon which suffrage must 
suggested that the Federal Government had no right to undertake to pro-
vide free school systems for the States. !d., at 167. But while sover-
eignty concerns cautioned many against imposing on the States the affir-
mative obligation to establish and finance a system of free public education, 
there was no objection to the second aspect of the proposed amendment--
that barring discrimination in the provision of education. Indeed, Senator 
Frelinghuysen thought the provision superfluous in this respect because 
"[t]he fourteenth amendment has that provision, and that amendment must 
be a part of the constitution [of the State seeking readmission] before any 
one of these States can be introduced." !d., at 168. 
There were other quixotic attempts to impose upon the States an affir-
mative duty to provide public education, but such proposals apparently en-
joyed no consensus in the Reconstruction Congress. For example, after 
the joint resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment had been sub-
mitted to the States for ratification, Representative Ashley sought to pro-
mote a revision of that amendment that would have combined a national 
rule of suffrage with the requirement that "[e]ach State shall establish and 
maintain, by equitable taxation, a thorough and efficient system of free 
public schools throughout the State, sufficiently numerous for the accom-
modation of all the children of the State." Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 117 (1867). This proposal, intended to assure that "every child shall 
be secured in its right to attend school until it acquires the rudiments of an 
education in the language of the country," id., at 118 (Rep. Ashley) , appar-
ently died in the Judiciary Committee with the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
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rest, and as the mechanism by which social cohesion and 
order might be restored to the Nation. 
c 
Bearing in mind this understanding of the significance of 
educ~ the Nation that adopted the Equal Protection 
Clause, an understanding long reflected in the decisions of 
this Court, we may determine the p_roper level of deference 
to be afforded the classification embodied in§ 21.031. Ambi-
guity in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, reflecting 
the persisting theme of federalism, see San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 44, suggests the need for re-
stEaint in subjecting to constitutionat""rev1ew ~ive 
deci§Ions invo1Vrnt11e financing, and supervision, of_2._ublic 
schoo s. 
-rft.it in one respect, the history of the period is unambigu-
ous with respect to education. The Framers of the Equal 
Protection Clause recognized that by denying certain disfa-
vored groups all access to education, we deny to the members 
of those groups the ability to advance their material well-be-
ing, to contribute productively to society, and the means to 
protect themselves within the structure of our social and 
civic institutions. Indeed, when we deny to some disfavored 
group the right to a basic educaiJ.pn, we deny to that gj_sfa-
vo~ers, the .!E_echanism by which..they 
might raise the level of esteem in which they are cu ntly 
he . The Equa rotection Clause WI no ightly sanction 
theparadoxical practice of denying to those born into a disfa-
vored class the means by which they might sustain them-
selves within the confines of our laws and our society. 
In San Antonio SchQ.ol District v. Rodriguez, supra, we 
faced an equal protection challenge to the Texas system of fi-
nancing public education. The Texas scheme, which relied 
in part on local property tax payments, was alleged to clas-
sify on the basis of a suspect classification-wealth-and to 
impinge on a fundamental interest-education. The Court 
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rejected both claims to strict judicial scrutiny. With respect 
to the "suspect class" line of analysis, we declined to extend 
our "most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly 
discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, 
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts 
that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts." 
I d., at 28. Responding to the argument that education con-
stitutes a fundamental right under the Constitution, we ob-
served that whatever force that "argument might have if a 
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of edu-
cational opportunities to any of its children, that argument 
provides no basis for finding an interference with funda-
mental rights where only relative differences in spending lev-
els are involved . . . . " I d., at 37. 
Th!§s_ase lies far on the other end of the eg_ual protection T ~ 
SRectru..ID..fr~odriguez. We are not presented here with 
a complex scheme of finance and funding indirectly resulting 
in comparative disadvantages for a fluid group that is defin-
able for purposes of equal protection analysis only by pres-
en~ within a~s favored geo~aphic area. Rather, § 21.031 
is expressly structured to impose direct and substantial dis-
abilities · · torically demeaned group, solely 
on the asis of personal statu . As we have seen, the State's 
facial discriminatiOn on e asis of that status, particularly 
as it affects children who are themselves unable to work any 
significant change in their circumstance, parallels in signifi-
cant respects the type of "class or caste" legislation with 
which the Equal Protection Clause is most directly con-
cerned. It may well be that the very unusual status of un-
documented children might allow a State some latitude to 
classify in a manner having a direct, adverse, and discrimina- ~ 
tory, impact on that group. But we think that to bar such a 
class from the public schools would be starkly inconsistent 
with the historical premises upon which the Equal Protection 
Clause rests, and an affront to the regard for education as a 
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primary tool of equality implicit therein. 
ance that the classification embodied in 
31 
some vital state need, it cannot withstand constitutional 
~ -scrutmy. 
IV 
Appellants argue that the classification at issue 29 furthers 
an interest in the "preservation of the state's limited re-
sources for the education of its lawful residents." Br. for 
Appellants 26. We note the illogic in this formulation of the 
State's interest-it assumes its conclusion by building on the 
premise that the State is entitled to prefer lawful residents to 
"unlawful residents" solely on the basis of that federally de-
fined status. 30 If illegal aliens were beyond the ambit of 
29 Appellant School District sought at oral argument to characterize the 
alienage classification contained in § 21.031 as simply a test of residence. 
We cannot uphold § 21.031 on that basis. Appellants conceded that if, for ~ 
example, a Virginian entered Tyler with his school age children, intending 
to remain only six months, those children would be viewed as residents and 
entitled to attend Tyler schools. Tr. of Or. Arg. 31-32. It is thus clear 
that Tyler's residence argument amounts to nothing more than the asser-
tion that illegal entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a 
resident for purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools. A 
State may not, however, accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited 
by the Equal Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as 
non-resident. Appellants have not shown that the families of undocu-
mented children do not comply with the established standards by which the 
State has historically tested residence. We note that § 21.031(b) requires 
a county to provide education only to resident children. The counties of 
the State are as free to apply to undocumented children established criteria 
for determining residence as they are to apply those criteria to any other 
child who seeks admission. See generally Arredondo v. Brockette, 648 
F . 2d 425 (CA5 1981). 
30 In this respect, the prerogatives of the State are significantly different 
from those of the Federal Government. Drawing distinctions between il-
legal aliens and lawfully admitted aliens, is "a routine and normally legiti-
mate part" of the business of the Federal Government, but not of the 
states. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U. S., at 85; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 
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equal protection, appellants' premise might be supportable. 
But because illegal aliens are entitled to the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the State must do more than justify 
its discrimination with a concise expression of its intention to 
discriminate. See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 
U. S. 572, 605 (1976). If tnc scrutin is to have any mean-
i~ it must be that the important interest t at t e State 
seeks to further is one inde enaent of the classification itself. 
Th1s 1s true even when "a state wishes to orrow a fe eral 
classification," for the question remains whether "the distinc-
tion is a reasonable one for the purposes for which the state 
desires to use it?" Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 665 
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Concern 
for fiscal integrity alone can hardly support the basis upon 
which a classification used in allocating those fiscal resources 
is drawn, especially where the classification is subject to 
strict scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, supra, 403 U. S., at 
374-375. Nevertheless, we discern in appellants' position 
th!ee colorable arguments that might support the State 
classification. 
First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may 
seek to protect the State from an influx of illegal immigrants. 
While a State may have an interest in mitigating the poten-
tially significant effects of sudden demographic shifts in popu-
lation, 31 it is clear that § 21.031 hardly offers an efficacious 
method of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic 
U. S. 1, 7 n. 8 (1977). 
31 Although the State has no direct interest in controlling entry into this 
country, that interest being one reserved by the Constitution to the Fed-
eral Government, unchecked unlawful migration might impair the State's 
economy generally, or the State's ability to provide some important serv-
ice. Despite the exclusive federal control of this Nation's borders, we can-
not conclude that the states are without any power to react to a significant 
influx of persons who have entered the United States without Federal 
sanction, and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on tradi-
tional state concerns. See DeCanas v. Bica, supra, 424 U. S. , at 354-356. 
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problem. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that 
illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's 
economy. To the contrary, the .availahle evidence suggests 
that illegal aliens underutilize public services while contribut-
ing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the 
State fisc. 458 F. Supp., at 578; 501 F. Supp., at 570-571. 
In addition, it was clearly established below that the domi-
nant incentive for illegal entry is the availability of employ-
ment; few, if any, illegal immigrants come to this country to 
avail themselves of a free education. 458 F. Supp., at 578. 
Even assuming that the net impact of illegal aliens on the 
economy of the State were negative, we think it clear that 
"[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a lu-
dicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immi-
gration," at least when compared with the alternative of 
prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens. Ibid. See 628 
F. 2d, at 461; 501 F. Supp., at 579 and n. 88. 
Second, appellants suggest that the admission of undocu-
mented children will deplete the limited educational re-
sources of the State, and that to avoid this depletion, undocu-
mented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion 
because of the burden they impose on the public schools. 
The record in no way supports the claim that the exclusion of 
undocumented children is an effective means of improving 
the quality of education in the State. As the District Court 
in No. 80-1934 noted, the Statefailed to offer any "credible 
supporting evidence that a proportionately small diminution 
of the funds spent on each child [which might result from de-
voting some State funds to the education of the excluded 
group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education." 
501 F. Supp., at 583. And, after reviewing the State's 
school financing mechanism, the District Court in No. 
80-1538 concluded that barring undocumented children from 
local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of 
education provided in those schools. 458 F. Supp., at 577. 
Of course, even if improvement in the quality of education 
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were a likely result of baJ!ing some .number of cpildren from 
the schools of the. Stiite, thB State '*ou1dnave to· support its 
selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclu-
sion. In terms of educational cost and need, undocumented 
children are "basically indistinguishable" from legally resi-
dent alien children. 458 F. Supp., at 589; 501 F. Supp., at 
583 and n. 104. 
Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children ~ 
are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence 
within the United States renders them less likely than other 
children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to 
put their education to productive social or political use within 
the State. Even assuming that such an interest were legiti-
mate, it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify; the 
State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will em-
ploy the education provided by the State within the confines 
of the State's borders. In any event, the record is clear that 
many, if not most, of the undocumented children disabled by 
this classification are likely to remain in this country, if per-
haps not in the State of Texas, and many will ultimately be-
come lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It is 
difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to 
achieve by promoting the creation, and perpetuation, of a 
subclass of illiterate persons who might remain within its 
boundaries, adding to the problems and costs of unemploy-
ment, welfare, and crime. But wherever the State finds its 
interest, it is for the benefit of the Nation that the Constitu-
tion bars discrimination. We think that the State acts in a 
manner inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause when 
it denies an education to a group of children on the assump-
tion that some of those children will ultimately depart from 
our national borders. 
v 
The justifications offered by the State in support ~f 
§ 21.031 do not approach the showing of~ompelling need re-' 
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quired if a State is to deny to this discrete group of children 
the free public education that it offers to every other child re-
siding within its borders. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in each of these cases is 
Affirmed. 
